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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, I study the interactions of students with 
limited English proficiency (LEP). It is vital to study these LEP students’ (LEPs) interactions because 
immigration into the United States continues to usher many foreign students with LEP into American 
schools. Additionally, U.S.-born children from immigrant homes enter schools knowing little English. 
In order to understand how best to instruct these limited English proficient (LEP) students, it is 
important to examine how concentration of LEP students (LEPs) affects educational outcomes of the 
LEPs themselves. On one hand, having a larger number of LEPs allows teachers to deliver a more 
focused instruction. On the other hand, LEPs may speak in their native languages more often and 
practice speaking English less when they are surrounded by many other LEPs. In this paper, I 
examine the effects of classmate English proficiency on the educational outcomes of LEP 5th graders 
using administrative data from an urban school district. Specifically, I study how exposure to LEPs 
affects the achievement, mainstreaming and grade retention of LEPs using the idiosyncratic variation 
in LEP shares across cohorts in a school. I find having more LEPs in a cohort leads to higher math 
achievement, faster mainstreaming and less grade retention amongst LEP students. 
 In the second essay, I partnered with Scott Imberman and Steven Craig. We identify the 
impact of gifted and talented services on student outcomes by exploiting a discontinuity in eligibility 
requirements and find no impact on standardized test scores of marginal students even though quality 
of peers and classes improve substantially. We then use randomized lotteries to examine the impact of 
attending a GT magnet program, relative to programs in other schools, and find that, despite exposure 
to higher quality teachers and peers, only science achievement improves. We find that the relative 
ranking of the students change, as do their grades, indicating that either invidious comparison peer 
effects or teaching targeting may be important. 
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 In the third essay (with Adriana Kugler), we examine the impact of remittances on 
households’ investments and consumption in Vietnam using the Living Standards Surveys. Given that 
households likely face budget constraints in Vietnam, one may expect for remittances to affect the 
decisions of households to invest and consume. In addition, since the unitary model of the household 
is particularly unlikely to represent households in developing countries, we also look at differential 
impacts when women receive a larger fraction of the remittances. We use an instrumental variables 
strategy to address the fact that households receiving different amounts of remittances and sending 
different amounts of remittances to women are likely to differ in terms of their observable and 
unobservable characteristics that correlate with investments and spending. We instrument the amount 
of remittances and the share of remittances going to women with the 1992 migration rate from the 
household's region of residence and the interaction between this variable and the share of women in 
the household. OLS results show that remittances are associated with better health of young, adult and 
older individuals, while the fraction of remittances received by women is associated with greater 
educational attainment and attendance, and less child labor while changing the composition of 
consumption expenditures from all categories towards health expenditures. However, when we use an 
IV strategy, we find that remittances increase education expenditure while reduce food expenditure. 
More importantly, the fraction of remittances received by women increases the household expenditure 
on health relative to other household expenditures. The results thus show not only the amount of 
remittances but also the identity of the receiver matters in terms of increasing human capital 
investments for children and their family members. 
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Chapter 1 
How do Limited English Proficient Students 
Affect Each Other’s Educational Outcomes? 
Evidence from Student Panel Data1 
1.1. Introduction 
Students are identified as having Limited English Proficiency if they do not speak English as their 
primary language and have limited ability to read, speak, or understand English.2 The number of 
these students in U.S. public schools has increased substantially over time. From the 2000 U.S. 
Census, almost 20 percent of U.S. school-age persons speak another language at home.3 
According to the National Clearinghouse for English Language Acquisition (NCELA), from the 
1995-96 to 2005-06 academic years and for grades PK-12, English learners’ enrollment increased 
by more than 57 percent, while overall enrollment increased by only 3 percent.4 As immigration 
continues to increase in the United States, addressing the academic needs of LEPs will be 
imperative. 
Once students are identified as LEP, schools accommodate them with English as a 
Second Language (ESL) or Bilingual Education (BE) programs. In ESL programs, instruction is 
                                                      
1 This project was conducted under the supervision of my advisors, Prof. Aimee Chin and Prof. Scott 
Imberman. I thank them. I also want to thank Prof. Steven Craig and the seminar participants in University 
of Houston graduate research workshop, the SEA, Prairie View A&M Research Seminar, and the AEFP 
conference. 
2 Note that LEPs are also called English Language Learners (ELLs). 
3 See http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t20/tab02.xls. 
4 See http://www.ncela.gwu.edu/files/uploads/4/GrowingLEP_0506.pdf. 
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done in English with supplemental language support. Students may have an in-class ESL teacher, 
or they may be placed into mainstream classes with occasional pull-out time to improve their 
English skills. In these mainstream classes, LEPs are taught alongside native speakers and other 
LEPs who speak the same or different home languages. In the anonymous urban school district 
from which I obtained my data, the ESL program serves mostly LEPs whose home languages are 
not Spanish, and when the number of LEPs in a language group in the district is not large enough 
to constitute a class. Another program is BE, in which students are generally placed in classrooms 
filled entirely with other LEPs who speak the same home language. In the anonymous school 
district, there are four types of bilingual education programs. Three are for students whose home 
language is Spanish.5 In these programs, instruction is done mostly in Spanish in the early grades. 
The amount of English instruction increases as students progress from grade to grade. The fourth 
type of BE was designed to serve LEPs whose home languages are non-Spanish.6 In this program, 
the students of the same home language receive primary language support for concept 
development and cultural enrichment activities. However, main language of instruction is 
English. In receiving these services, LEPs are exposed to peers who are also LEP. 
Much of the discussion and research on the instruction of the LEPs revolves around 
whether it is better to teach them in their native languages or in English. Matsudaira (2005) 
exploits the quasi-random assignment of students to bilingual and mainstream (English 
immersion) classes to compare the effects of the two programs. Comparing the students’ scores 
during the four years after the assignment, the author finds little difference between the two 
programs. The author stresses possible effects coming from peers, as BE students with low 
English ability and achievement are taught in classrooms with students from similar educational 
and cultural backgrounds. The author also notes that finding small differences between the two 
                                                      
5 Two of these programs serve only LEPs, while the goal of the third one is to develop full 
bilingualism for both Spanish speaking LEPs and English proficient students. 
6 As of 2009-10, this program is only implemented for students from homes speaking Vietnamese. 
Students from Mandarin, Arabic and Urdu households will soon be served under this program.  
3 
programs suggests that peer quality does not matter in the context of immigrant children or that 
any positive effects coming from the differences in the two programs offset by possible (negative) 
effects from peer quality. Before this paper, meta-analyses have found conflicting results. While 
Baker and de Kanter (1981) and Rossell and Baker (1996) find little evidence to support BE, 
Greene (1998) finds evidence supporting BE over English immersion. Clearly, a consensus has 
not yet been reached in this literature and an important impediment is the paucity of studies with 
convincing research designs. Nonetheless, little is known about how interactions among LEPs are 
generated as the result of these programs, and the effects of such interactions on LEPs 
themselves. This chapter identifies the impact of exposure to other LEPs on the educational 
outcomes of LEPs themselves. It examines the existence and size of peer effects among LEPs. 
Most economics studies of how peers influence each other in educational settings have 
focused on the effects of exposure to peers with higher and lower school performance on 
academic and behavioral outcomes of primary and secondary students,7 or on the effects of 
exposure to peers with more or less disruptive behavior.8 The focus of these studies has been the 
general student population. One of these papers, Betts and Zau (2004), looks at the impact of 
classroom and grade level peer achievement on individual elementary school students’ rate of 
achievement. When Betts and Zau conduct the analysis on the subsample of English learners, 
they find that the classroom peer effect is highly significant, and is almost double the 
corresponding coefficient for all students. 
Other papers have looked at the effects of exposure to peers from the same/different 
gender and racial group. For example, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2009) find that a higher 
percentage of black schoolmates reduces achievement levels for blacks. Hoxby (2000) finds that 
students are affected by the achievements of their peers, and intra-race peer effects are stronger. 
Lavy and Schlosser (2011) find that a higher proportion of females improves the cognitive 
                                                      
7 Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2003); Angrist and Lang (2004); Hoxby and Weingarth 
(2006); Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser (2008); Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote (forthcoming). 
8 Figlio (2005); Aizer (2008); Carrell and Hoekstra (2010). 
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outcomes of both girls and boys. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010) look at peer effects on 
students’ long-run outcomes, such as labor outcomes and teenage births. They find that peer 
characteristics have little effect, except for the proportion of girls. For instance, they find that 
while a higher proportion of girls has a negative effect on the completed education of boys, it has 
a positive effect on the education of girls. 
To my knowledge, two papers have looked at peer effects coming from students speaking 
a language other than English at home. First, Friesen and Krauth (2011) estimate the effect of the 
home language and other characteristics of a student’s same-grade classmates on the achievement 
of that student. Using three cohorts of students in British Columbia, the authors estimate the 
effect of classroom composition on the achievement of students when they are in 4th grade, again 
when they are in 7th grade, and the students’ achievement gains. They find that differences in 
peers’ home languages affect student academic performance. Particularly, relative to English 
home language peers, there is a small net benefit coming from Chinese home-language peers on 
grade 4 scores and a cost from Punjabi home-language peers on grade 7 scores and score gain. 
While Friesen and Krauth (2011) focus on the effect of attending “enclave” schools on the 
achievement of students, my project focuses on the population of students who are most likely to 
be influenced by the spoken languages of their peers, the LEPs, and how being among LEPs 
affects their student outcomes. I estimate peer effects amongst these students with a much richer 
dataset and in a context that is more applicable to US education. Additionally, Friesen and 
Krauth’s estimates do not distinguish between effects of exposure to a certain ethnic group from 
effects of exposure to less English proficient students, and likely many of the students with 
Chinese and Punjabi home languages in their dataset are proficient in English. Finally, besides 
examining the effect of the share of students who are LEP on student achievement, I also analyze 
its effect on the mainstreaming and grade retention of these students.  
The second closely related paper studies how immigrant children affect the academic 
achievement of native Dutch children. Specifically, Ohinata and Ours (2011) use data from the 
5 
2001 and 2006 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the 1995 and 2007 
Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) to analyze the effect of 
concentration of immigrant children on the achievement of native Dutch children. To overcome 
the endogenity problem of school attendance, the authors control for school fixed effects. They do 
not find strong evidence of negative spillover effects on the test scores from immigrant children 
to native Dutch children. However, they find that immigrant children themselves experience 
negative language-related spillover effects from having more immigrant children in the classroom 
but no spillover effects on the math and science scores. While Ohinata and Ours (2011) focus on 
the effect coming from immigrant children, my chapter concentrates on the effects coming from 
those with limited English proficiency to get at the language spillover. In general, peer effects 
from LEPs are not the same as peer effects from immigrants. According to the Urban Institute, 40 
percent of LEPs, ages 5-19 are foreign born.9  
Empirical identification of the effect of peers who are LEP on other LEPs is difficult 
because LEPs are not distributed randomly across schools. Families select where they live and 
where to send their children to school, while school administrators assign students to a particular 
class for special instruction or instruction from a specific teacher. As the result, estimates of the 
effect of the share of LEPs in a grade on LEPs will capture both peer effects and effects coming 
from the unobserved characteristics that also affect the outcome variables and peer selection. To 
deal with the selection bias, I utilize a rich panel data set and employ various fixed effects. By 
focusing on specifications that incorporate school fixed effects and school-specific time trends, I 
am able to control for unobservable characteristics that might correlate with the LEP share. This 
empirical strategy depends on there being some variation across cohorts’ LEP shares within a 
                                                      
9 See http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410654_NABEPresentation.pdf. 
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school that is idiosyncratic.10 Such cohort-to-cohort variation might arise from natural population 
fluctuations, including from births and migration.  
Estimating the reduced-form effects of cohort LEP share on the educational outcomes of 
LEPs, I find the share of LEPs in a cohort has positive and significant effects on academic 
achievement of LEP 5th graders, particularly in math scores. These results appear to be more 
pronounced for males and for students coming from schools with more low socio-economic status 
students. I also find significantly faster mainstreaming of LEPs. The by-grade analysis suggests 
that students are most likely to be mainstreamed at the first opportunity, which is the year after 
first grade. Finally, I find that students with higher cohort LEP share are less likely to be retained. 
The negative effect of cohort LEP share on retention appears to be larger for students from 
schools with more low socio-economic status students and for students with lower initial 
achievement. 
These reduced-form effects can be the result of many mechanisms, and I investigate a 
few of these empirically. I provide evidence that the positive LEP peer effects do not come from 
student differential enrollment in BE and ESL programs, differential peer achievement, or 
differential peer English-language proficiency. The remainder of the chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 1.2 discusses the background information, specifically about the conceptual 
framework and LEP identification at the school district. Section 1.3 explains the empirical 
strategy. Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 presents the results. Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2. Background 
1.2.1. Conceptual Framework 
The share of LEPs may affect the academic outcomes of LEPs in various ways. One 
possible channel is by changing the speed of English language acquisition. There are many 
                                                      
10 Hoxby (2000) is one of the earliest to apply this strategy, and she uses it to identify racial and gender 
peer effects on student achievement.  
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studies that have linked inadequate English proficiency to low student achievement (Clewell, Fix, 
and Ruiz-de-Velasco, 2000; Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco, 2001; August and Shanahan, 
2006). When LEPs and proficient speakers of English are given the same math exam written in 
English, the former group scores lower than the latter. LEPs perform better when they receive 
linguistic accommodation, such as modification of math questions or simplified English 
dictionaries during exams (Abedi and Lord, 2001; Albus, Thurlow, Liu, and Bielinski, 2005). 
Having higher English proficiency increases understanding of the math questions and appears to 
improve English reading scores. Also, the sooner the LEPs become proficient in English, the 
earlier the students spend all their time in learning the content of the class, instead of working on 
improving their English skills. Moreover, having low English proficiency may act as a signal of 
low student achievement. As a result, LEPs may not be selected to take more challenging courses, 
lowering their achievement (Wang and Goldschmidt, 1999). 
Being surrounded by other students who are also LEPs may affect the English acquisition 
of LEPs. The amount of time immigrant adolescent students spend speaking English in informal 
settings is predictive of English language proficiency (Carhill, Suarez-Orozco, and Paez, 2008). 
Being among students with limited English proficiency may reduce the quantity and quality of 
LEPs’ conversations in English. For one thing, students may utilize their home languages more in 
conversations when speaking to classmates who are from the same home language group 
(Willoughby, 2009). In speaking to other LEPs whose home languages are different, LEPs use 
English, but due to the students’ limitations in their English proficiency, they expose each other 
to more broken English. 
Additionally, studies in the area of English fluency suggest the size of one’s language 
group affects one’s English proficiency. Lazear (1999) theorizes and finds evidence in the 1900 
and 1990 US censuses that immigrants from groups with large proportions in the local population 
learn English more slowly than immigrants from groups with smaller proportions in the local 
population. Angrist, Chin, and Godoy (2008) find that the 1949 change of language of instruction 
8 
in public schools from English to Spanish in Puerto Rico had little effect on Puerto Rican 
English-speaking ability. This suggests that language environments are relevant in the process of 
learning English. For LEPs, the language they hear from their classmates matters, not just the 
language of instruction. For instance, a large group of students speaking the same home language 
may have less incentive to learn English, as the students can rely on others to help them to 
understand the classroom materials. 
LEPs may affect each other’s academic outcomes through other channels, besides that of 
English learning. Among all students, including LEPs, peer effects involve students teaching one 
another. Even though LEPs may have similar level of English proficiency, those who are 
immigrants enter American schools with different academic histories (Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-
Orozco, 2001). Thus, within a classroom, there is diversity in terms of student knowledge of the 
classroom materials. Additionally, a student’s innate ability and knowledge of his/her home 
culture and language can affect his/her peers by ways of knowledge spillover and through 
adjustments to the classroom standard of English language proficiency. Coming from culturally 
diverse homes, LEPs may influence their peers through different attitudes toward schooling and 
habits of study. Not only do students coming from different families affect other students, but 
students from different cultures also affect each other. 
Furthermore, the effects of LEP share on the outcomes of LEPs can come from classroom 
instruction. The mechanisms are similar to those of ability grouping. Teachers have students who 
are similar in English proficiency. As a result, the teachers can focus their instruction of these 
students. The students receive specialized instruction appropriate to their level of English 
proficiency, including instruction that furthers their English acquisition. Additionally, due to the 
prevalence of LEPs throughout the school, teachers in regular classes may be more familiar with 
the best practices of instructing LEPs, and will know how to accommodate them if there are one 
or two LEPs in their classrooms. 
9 
To summarize, there are various channels through which cohort LEP share can affect 
student achievement. While interactions among LEPs may result in slower English acquisition, 
which reduces student educational outcomes, these interactions may result in student learning 
from each other, which might have a positive effect on student outcomes. While being placed in 
the same classroom means that LEPs are less exposed to native speakers, this grouping allows 
teachers to deliver a specialized curriculum to LEPs, which might translate into more effective 
learning. Together, the effect on student outcomes can be either negative or positive, depending 
on the size of each effect. My reduced-form estimates will encompass all these various effects, 
but I will be able to speak to the roles of a few potential mechanisms. In particular, I will consider 
whether impacts work through achievement peer effects or changes in instructional settings. 
1.2.2. LEP Identification in the District 
In the district I study, state law delineates the identification of LEPs. A committee set up 
at each school is in charge of this process and of the placement of LEPs in the appropriate 
program available at each school. The identification process begins with the Home Language 
Survey, which is sent home to the parents to be completed within four weeks of each student’s 
enrollment to determine the spoken language in the student’s home and the language that the 
student uses at home. If the answer to either question is a language other than English, then the 
student’s language proficiency is evaluated through oral exams and/or the student’s past or 
current written reading and language tests. If a new student is identified as LEP, the committee 
must determine his/her English proficiency level and the most appropriate instructional program 
for him/her. 
Parents’ approval for their children’s enrollment in a BE or ESL program must be 
obtained. If the parent wishes to waive program participation, the LEP student is assigned to all 
10 
English classes, and receives regular instructional and testing programs.11 However, this student 
is considered LEP until he/she meets the exit criteria. 
All students from grades 1-11 in the district take nationally norm referenced achievement 
tests. Non-Spanish speaking LEPs take the Stanford Achievement Test, while Spanish speaking 
LEPs take the Aprenda exam, which is an exam written in Spanish and modeled after the 
Stanford exam. Examining all LEP students in the district from 1st to 5th grade from school years 
1998-99 to 2009-10 reveals that in 1st grade the percentages taking Stanford and Aprenda were 20 
and 75, respectively. In grade 5, the two numbers were 83 and 13, respectively. It appears that I 
do not have data on achievement for all students in every grade.12 One of the potential reasons for 
missing achievement scores is that the committee may exempt Year 1 immigrant LEPs who are 
determined to be non-literate at time of entry.13 The school committee determines which test each 
LEP student takes based on the language used most for reading/language Arts instruction. 
Students also take an English language proficiency exam. This exam examines the students’ 
progress in learning the English language in four language domains: listening, speaking, reading, 
and writing. Students’ scores come in the forms of ratings from 1 to 4, which translate to 
beginning, intermediate, advanced, and advanced high, respectively. 
All LEPs must be formally exited from the program. LEPs in PK-1st grade may not be 
exited from the BE or ESL programs. If the student meets the exit criteria, he/she will be assigned 
regular classes at the beginning of 2nd grade. The criteria to exit from LEP services include being 
classified as Fluent or as English Speaker in the IDEA Proficiency Test (a test of oral language 
proficiency) for all grades, and scoring greater than the 40th percentile in both Stanford reading 
and language tests in grade 1-2, or scoring at least “passing” in the reading and ELA (English 
language arts) English sections of the state standardized exam in grades 3-12. To tabulate some 
                                                      
11 From the data, about 6 percent of the observations with non-missing information on parents’ 
approval have parents waiving LEP program participation. 
12 Having missing achievement scores does not appear to have any significant relationship with the 
variable of interest.  
13 See Table 1.A2 in Appendix for more details.  
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statistics regarding mainstreaming at the district, I construct a sample of data limited to 
observations of students who are LEP in 1st grade, and I observe them in grades 2-5 for the school 
years 1998-99 to 2009-10. In grade 2, about 8 percent of the students are mainstreamed. By grade 
5, 40 percent of the students are mainstreamed.14 
1.3. Empirical Strategy  
Before describing my empirical strategy, a unique issue about examining the achievement 
test scores of LEP students should be mentioned.  Spanish speaking LEPs are assessed in Spanish 
and others in English. It is likely endogenous what language the exams are taken by LEPs in this 
school district. Higher ability students may be given opportunity to take the Stanford exam earlier 
and may be mainstreamed faster, and higher quality schools may mainstream their students faster 
as well. Additionally, Akresh and Akresh (2011) find that depending on the students’ English 
proficiency, students’ scores on an exam vary with the language of the exam. Looking at 
statistics, the majority of students who take the Aprenda exam in 1st grade continue to take 
Aprenda in 2nd and 3rd grade. However, by 5th grade, less than 1 percent of these students take the 
Aprenda exam.15 Given these statistics, to limit the bias coming from the endogeneity in the type 
of exam the students take, I restrict my analysis of test score outcomes to 5th graders. Another 
reason for looking at the 5th graders is that I am able to estimate a longer run effect of exposure to 
LEPs, so my estimates reflect accumulated effects of exposure to students with limited English 
proficiency. 
A major empirical challenge in estimating peer effects is the potential correlation 
between the share of peers who are LEP and a number of factors that are unobservable to the 
researcher, such as parental preference of residential location and school, neighborhood 
                                                      
14 See Table 1.A3 in Appendix for more details. 
15 See Table 1.A1 in Appendix. This is also consistent with the practice at the district, whereby 
qualified LEPs enter a pre-exit phase in 4th or 5th grade. Here students’ language of instruction is mostly 
English, and student assessments change from the Aprenda to the Stanford exam. 
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characteristics, and school quality. These unobservable factors generally affect both the share of 
peers who are LEP and the LEPs’ own achievements and behavior. This suggests that traditional 
estimates of the share of LEPs on the student outcomes of LEPs may be biased. 
I rely on variations across cohorts within schools by including school fixed effects to 
identify the effect of LEP share on the outcomes of LEPs. Particularly, I estimate a regression 
model similar to 
€ 
Yics = α + βAVGLEPShareics +ΩXics +ΠCcs +ΦGcs +ηs +ε ics (1) 
on 5th grade LEPs, where the unit of observation is LEP 5th grader i in cohort c and school s. 
Variable  is an educational outcome of interest of LEP 5th graders; 
€ 
AVGLEPShare  is 
“average grade LEP share”, which is the share of students in a grade classified as LEP averaged 
over the grades the 5th grade LEP student has been through in the district. This variable provides a 
measure for an average exposure to LEPs. Matrix  includes student characteristics, namely 
gender, ethnicity, initial achievement, and indicators of whether the student is economically 
disadvantaged, a recent immigrant, a gifted student, or a special education student. The term 
“initial” means 1st grade or the first grade the student was in the district. Student initial 
achievement consists of student’s initial scores in math, reading, and language, three dummy 
variables indicating whether the respective exam was Stanford (or Aprenda), and interactions of 
the score and its corresponding Stanford exam indicator.16 It also contains year fixed effects, 
which control for the common time effects across all schools. Matrix 
€ 
C  includes shares of 
student characteristics in the 5th grader i’s 1st grade cohort. These shares are included in the 
regression to capture the characteristics of the group of students to whom the 5th grader i is 
supposed to have exposure to throughout his elementary school had everyone in his cohort 
entered the district at the same time, assuming normal grade progression. 
€ 
G  includes shares of 
student characteristics in the students’ 5th grade cohort. These shares of student characteristics are 
                                                      
16 I do not have enough data on the student English proficiency exam to control for student initial 
English proficiency. 
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the share of students who are economically disadvantaged, the share of students who are female, 
the share of students who are gifted, in special education, Native American, Asian, Black, and 
White. These shares are included to capture the observable characteristics of the student i’s 5th 
grade cohort.  is a school fixed effect that absorbs permanent unobserved factors of the school, 
such as school quality, which may affect both LEP share and student achievement.17 In this 
context, school fixed effects are meaningful controls for selection across schools. For example, 
schools may have unobservable characteristics that attract LEPs, and these factors also affect 
student outcomes. With the school fixed effects, I am able to control for these unobservable 
characteristics such as a school’s general educational environment and quality, which are likely to 
be constant over time. The term 
€ 
ε ics  is the random error, which might be correlated across student 
observations from the same school and across time, and might include an individual random 
element.18 
One concern is that parents and school administrators may have discretion in placing 
LEPs into a particular classroom. To avoid the selection at the classroom level I focus on 
analyzing the effect of average LEP shares in the grade rather than shares in the student’s 
classroom on outcomes of LEPs.  
The second concern is that over the 12 years of the panel, there may be time-varying 
unobservable factors that are also correlated with the LEP shares and with student outcomes 
within the same school. Specifically, these time-varying unobservable factors such as teacher 
quality may be trending over time in a way that is correlated with LEP share. For example, 
schools successful at teaching LEPs may attract more LEPs over time. As a result, schools might 
show systematic trends in the share of their LEPs. Thus, unobserved differences in students 
across cohorts, and within the same school, could be correlated with differences in the LEP shares 
                                                      
17 By including student fixed effects, the variation in a student’s LEP share would come from grade 
promoters, repeaters, students switching schools, and new immigrants, hence I exclude student fixed 
effects.  
18 I use robust standard errors that are clustered at the school level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
(2004).  
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and confound estimates of the effect of LEP shares. To address this concern, I control for school 
specific linear trends by running the following regression model: 
€ 
Yics = α + βAVGLEPShareics +ΩXics +ΠCcs +ΦGcs + ρs × cohortc +ηs +ε ics(2). 
Equation (2) is similar to that of (1), except for the school-specific linear time trends factor, 
€ 
ρs × cohortc . Here, identification of average grade LEP share comes from the deviation of the 
average grade LEP share from its long-term trend within a school. 
Finally, the third concern is that the LEP shares may be endogenous, as students get 
evaluated for mainstreaming every year. This happens because LEP statuses can change. When 
students enter the district, schools evaluate their English proficiency and identify their LEP 
statuses. However, by 2nd grade, LEP students can be mainstreamed. Once the students are 
mainstreamed, they are no longer identified as LEP. Thus, LEP status correlates with 
unobservable characteristics such as school, teacher, and LEP program quality. Accordingly, I 
focus my analysis on students who have ever been classified as LEP19. I call these students ever-
LEPs. Additionally, the average grade LEP share or AVGLEPShare comes from the share of 
students who are LEP in a given grade and school. By definition, this share is the same as the 1st 
grade cohort LEP share for a given cohort if students do not repeat or jump a grade, no student 
leaves/enters the school during the time frame, and no student gets mainstreamed. In the event the 
LEPs get classified as non-LEP, the average grade LEP share will be smaller than the 1st grade 
cohort LEP share as students progress from grade to grade. More worrisome is the possibility that 
the differences between the two variables will be correlated with the unobservable characteristics 
that also affect student outcomes. For example, students may be mainstreamed faster at a higher-
quality school. If the mechanisms that dictate the higher rate of mainstreaming also affect 
achievement and retention, then my estimates of the average grade LEP share will be biased. To 
address the possibility that AVGLEPShare is endogenous, I measure exposure to LEPs using 1st 
                                                      
19 This definition retains students’ initial LEP statuses if they enter the district before grade 1, as the 
general practice is that if a student is LEP prior to grade 1, he/she can only be mainstreamed at the 
beginning of grade 2. 
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grade cohort LEP share, which is the share of students in 5th grader i’s 1st grade cohort who are 
LEP. This measure captures initial exposure to LEPs, before any mainstreaming which is 
potentially endogenous as explained above. In Section 1.5.6, I use 2SLS to estimate the effect of 
average grade LEP share on outcomes of the ever-LEPs using 1st grade cohort LEP share as the 
identifying instrument. For now, my interest lies in estimating the reduced-form effects of cohort 
LEP share on student outcomes. Specifically, I estimate reduced-form effects of cohort LEP share 
on student outcomes following the econometric model below: 
€ 
Yics = α + βcohort _LEP _ sharecs +ΩXics +ΠCcs +ΦGcs + ρs × cohortc +ηs +ε ics (3), 
where 
€ 
cohort _LEP _ sharecs  is the share of students who are LEP in the student’s 1st grade 
cohort, and cohort LEP share henceforth.  
Essentially, the panel data model with school fixed-effects and school-specific time 
trends is relying on cohort variations within schools to identify the effect. There are works that 
rely on idiosyncratic variations in adjacent cohorts for identification of peer effects. Hoxby 
(2000), Lavy and Schlosser (2011), and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010) use idiosyncratic 
changes in gender composition to look for gender peer effects. Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 
(2009) use idiosyncratic variations in the proportion of immigrants to study the impact of 
immigrants on student performance. Hoxby (2000) also uses the cohort-to-cohort changes in the 
share of students who are of a particular racial ethnic group to find racial peer effects. My 
methodology is similar to these papers. The basic idea is to compare outcomes of LEPs from 
different cohorts who have similar characteristics and face the same school environment, except 
for the fact that the share of LEPs is higher in one cohort than another due to random factors. 
Similar to these papers, my key identifying assumption is that conditional on student, grade and 
cohort observable characteristics, school fixed effects, and school specific trends, the cohort LEP 
shares are uncorrelated with changes in unobservable factors that could affect students’ 
educational outcomes. This assumption is reasonable as I rely on the natural fluctuation in the 
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number of children who speak a language other than English at home. For example, in this school 
year, 30 percent of the 1st graders are LEP. In the following school year, that number is likely to 
be different, as the number of total students and the number of LEPs in a particular neighborhood 
depends on who lives in the neighborhood and the age distribution of the school-aged children. I 
rely on these small changes in cohort LEP share to identify the effects of cohort LEP share on 
student outcomes. Parents may know the average LEP share at a school, but the parents may not 
be able to anticipate the changes in the LEP shares from one cohort to another, and it would be 
much harder for parents to anticipate the deviations from school trends in LEP share. 
1.4. Data  
My data consist of administrative records for students from a large urban school district 
in the Southwest United States. The data set comprises of student demographics, including 
gender, ethnicity, economic status, gifted status, special education status, recent immigrant status, 
home language, and test scores for every student in the district up to 12th grade. Testing data 
include the Stanford and Aprenda achievement test scaled scores. Separately, for each exam I 
standardize the scaled scores across the district within grade and year using all students in the 
district. Testing data also include the English Language Proficiency exam ratings. However, 
while other data are available from the 1998-99 to 2009-10 school years, these ratings are only 
available from school year 2004-05 to school year 2009-10. In addition to the ratings on students’ 
language domains of listening, speaking, reading, and writing, I have a composite rating. This 
composite rating is determined from the four language domains, with the highest weight of 75 
percent being placed on the reading rating. 
To obtain the sample used for my empirical analysis, I first restrict the data to grades 1-5. 
I define the grade the student enters into the district as the earliest grade he/she appears in the 
data. I also define a student’s LEP status as the LEP status when he/she first entered the data. This 
is the student’s ever-LEP status. I construct the LEP share as the share of students who are LEP in 
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a grade and school. Next, I assign each student a 1st grade cohort. A student’s cohort is a group of 
students who start a grade at the same school and year. For students who enter the district after 1st 
grade, which is less than 25 percent of the sample, I assign them to the 1st grade cohort to which 
they would have belonged had they been in their entering school since 1st grade assuming normal 
grade progression. For all the student characteristics including economically disadvantaged, 
gifted, and special education status, sex and ethnicity, I also construct share of student 
characteristics in a grade and school, and in a cohort and school in similar fashion.  
Lastly, to obtain a cumulative measure of 5th graders’ exposure to LEPs, I construct a 
measure that encompasses their exposure to LEPs over the length of time they were in the district. 
This variable is the “average grade LEP share”, i.e. AVGLEPShare. The variable gives the share 
of students in a grade classified as LEP averaged over the grades the student has been in the 
district. 
My panel data set spans from the 1998-99 to 2009-10 school years. I drop students who 
are never classified as LEP, observations coming from students’ first-year in the sample, and 
observations of students who have not yet reached grade 5. For those who repeat 5th grade, I keep 
only their first 5th grade observations. Additionally, after dropping observations with missing data 
on variables used in the empirical analysis, I have a total of 44,436 ever-LEP students in 216 
schools. Within this sample, almost 84 percent of the students observed entered the district in 1st 
grade or earlier. 
My achievement outcomes are the Stanford scores in math, reading, and language. In 
addition to achievement, from a policy standpoint, mainstreaming and retention are important 
educational outcomes for LEPs. A student is mainstreamed if the student meets the LEP exit 
criteria, and thus is no longer classified as LEP. These mainstreamed students take regular 
classes. To assess the effect of exposure to LEPs on student grade retention, I construct a dummy 
variable indicating whether the student was ever-retained since 1st grade or since he/she entered 
the school district, if the student entered the district after 1st grade.  
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Panel A of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for all ever-LEP 5th graders in the 
district. Regarding achievement scores, while LEPs’ average scores on math gather around the 
mean of zero, scores for reading and language are much lower, 0.22 and 0.17 of a standard 
deviation below the math score, respectively. On average, cohort LEP share is 56 percent. The 
average “average grade LEP share” is about 50 percent. About 95 percent of the students are 
economically disadvantaged by definition of being eligible for free or reduced price lunches or 
being otherwise economically disadvantaged. Almost 95 percent of the students are Hispanic. 
More than 62 percent of the students are classified as LEP. 
Next, I divide the full sample into two subsamples, depending on the observation’s cohort 
LEP share. Panel B is restricted to observations of those with cohort LEP shares above the full 
sample’s median of cohort LEP share, and Panel C is restricted to observations of those with 
cohort LEP shares equal to or below that figure. Simple comparisons between the statistics in 
Panels B and C reveal that students with higher cohort LEP shares tend to have lower 5th grade 
achievements relative to students with lower cohort LEP shares. They also appear to be more 
likely to be recent immigrants and Hispanics. Their schools also seem to be larger, with more 
students enrolling in BE and fewer students enrolling in ESL classes. 
The dissimilar statistics of the high cohort LEP share and lower cohort LEP share 
subsamples suggest that a simple OLS regression of exposure to LEPs on student outcome will be 
biased. Even if I control for their observable characteristics there are likely many unobservable 
underlying factors that affect both the measures of exposure to LEPs and student outcome at the 
school, providing biased estimates. As a result, I apply an empirical strategy that utilizes 
idiosyncratic variation of cohort LEP shares within schools to estimate the effect of exposure to 
LEPs on student outcomes. 
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1.5. Results 
My key identifying assumption is that conditional on student, grade, and cohort 
observable characteristics, school fixed effects, and school specific trends, the cohort LEP shares 
are uncorrelated with changes in unobservable factors that could affect students’ educational 
outcomes. Following Lavy and Schlosser (2011) and Bifulco, Fletcher, and Ross (forthcoming), I 
first examine whether there is sufficient variation in cohort LEP shares after controlling for 
school fixed effects and trends to obtain precise estimates.20 Table 1.2 displays the variation of 
cohort LEP shares as raw data and the variation that is left after removing school fixed effects and 
trends. Standard deviations are reduced by almost 70 percent after removing school fixed effects 
and trends. This means that most of the variation is across schools as it disappears when school 
fixed effects are included. I rely on the remaining variation to estimate the impact of cohort LEP 
share on student outcomes. Table 1.2 suggests I have sufficient variation to estimate the effects. 
The variation in cohort LEP share after the removal of school fixed effects and trends is more 
than double the variation in student composition within schools reported by Bifulco, Fletcher, and 
Ross (forthcoming). That amount of variation was enough for the authors to obtain significant 
estimates of the effect of cohort composition on outcomes of high school students. 
1.5.1. Effect of Cohort LEP Share on Student Achievement 
Table 1.3 reports reduced-form estimates of the effects of cohort LEP share on student 
achievement using the sample of all ever-LEP 5th graders who have been in the district for at least 
a year. Outcome variables are student 5th grade standardized Stanford achievement scores. Their 
means and standard deviations are listed in the table.  
Column 1 lists the coefficients of cohort LEP share from regressions of student 
achievement on cohort LEP share controlling for student characteristics and initial achievement, 
                                                      
20 I do not provide results of a “balancing test” as in Lavy and Schlosser (2011) and Bifulco, Fletcher, 
and Ross (forthcoming), because by construction cohort LEP share correlates with many of the student 
characteristics in my data.  
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as well as year fixed effects. Student characteristics are gender, economically disadvantaged 
status, recent immigrant status, gifted status, special education status, and student ethnicity. The 
estimated effects of cohort LEP share on student achievement are negative. They are large and 
significant for reading and language scores. This relationship is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics in Table 1.1, where schools with higher cohort LEP share tend to have lower student 
achievement. 
Some cohort-grade characteristics are added to the previous specification and the results 
are reported in column 2. These variables are shares of student characteristics, except for recent 
immigrant status, in the student 1st grade and 5th grade cohorts.21 With the addition of cohort 
controls, the estimates are no longer significant, but are still negative. However, when I add 
campus fixed effects in the third specification, the math and reading estimates turn positive and 
remain insignificant as shown in column 3. This change in sign is a result of using the variation 
across cohorts within schools and throwing out cross-school variation to identify the effects of 
cohort LEP share. Next, in column 4, school specific time trends are added as controls. This 
specification is my preferred specification, as it controls for possible school trends in addition to 
campus fixed effects, and it identifies the effects using the deviations from school specific time 
trends in cohort LEP share. 
Only the effects of cohort LEP share on math scores are significant at the 5 percent level. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation or a 20-percentage point increase in cohort LEP share 
increases the math scores in 5th grade by more than 0.02 of a standard deviation. For reading and 
language scores, the estimates are positive but not statistically significant. Hence, overall there 
appears to be no negative effect of cohort LEP share on reading and language scores, and there is 
evidence of positive effect on math. 
                                                      
21 The shares of students who are recent immigrants in a cohort and a grade are excluded to lessen the 
concern of co-linearity with the variable of interest, as a recent immigrant student is likely to be limited in 
English proficiency. 
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1.5.2. Effect of Cohort LEP Share on Mainstreaming of LEPs 
Once LEPs gain enough proficiency in English to function in mainstream classes (as 
determined by a committee - see Section 1.2.2), then they exit LEP status and cease to receive BE 
or ESL instruction. Mainstreaming is a goal of educational programs for LEP students. In Table 
1.4, I analyze how cohort LEP share affects the mainstreaming of LEP students, I first examine 
how cohort LEP share affects the number of years the ever-LEP students were classified as LEP 
in elementary school using the full sample of 5th graders who have been in the district at least a 
year and who are 1st grade or prior entrants.22 Panel A of Table 1.4 reports results of this analysis. 
On average, ever-LEP students are classified as LEP for about 4.3 years out of potential five 
years (grade 1-5) in elementary school.23 The simple OLS regression with initial achievement, 
student characteristics, and year fixed effects as controls reveals little relationship between cohort 
LEP share and the number of years ever-LEP students were classified as LEP as reported in 
column 1. However, starting with the next specification, when controls are added, we begin to see 
a pattern. The estimates turn negative, get larger in magnitude, and become significant as controls 
and fixed-effects are added. Under the preferred specification, we see that higher cohort LEP 
share significantly reduces the number of years ever-LEP students are classified as LEP in 
elementary school. Specifically, a one standard deviation or a 20-percentage point increase in 
cohort LEP share decreases this time by 0.064 years or 0.57 months on a 9-month school year. 
I find that ever-LEP students are mainstreamed faster. When is this faster mainstreaming 
occurring during students’ academic career? In panel B of Table 1.4, I examine how cohort LEP 
share affects the probability of LEPs being mainstreamed by a given grade.24 In this analysis, I 
limit observations to a sample of students who were LEP in 1st grade. I follow these students for 
the next four years. My outcome variable is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the student 
is no longer classified as LEP and thereafter. Thus, the coefficient for cohort LEP share gives the 
                                                      
22 Limiting the sample to 1st grade entrants dropped 7,170 observations from the sample. 
23 The measure was obtained after limiting the original sample of data to grades 1-5. 
24 Students are mainstreamed when they meet exit criteria as described in Section 1.2. 
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effect of cohort LEP share on the cumulative rate of mainstreaming up to the given year. The 
results suggest that the students are significantly likely to be mainstreamed in the 2nd year, which 
is the earliest LEPs can be mainstreamed. Looking at year 2 results, under the preferred 
specification, a one standard deviation or a 20-percentage point increase in cohort LEP share 
increases the probability of LEP students being mainstreamed by about 2 percentage points. The 
effect size is about 20 percent of the mean of being mainstreamed in year 2, which is 0.092. For 
years 3-5, cohort LEP share does not have a significant effect on mainstreaming, suggesting that 
students with lower cohort LEP share caught up with students with higher cohort LEP share. In 
other words, higher cohort LEP share causes some LEP 1st graders to be mainstreamed sooner – 
in second grade rather than third grade, and that there is little differential mainstreaming by 
cohort LEP share in later grades of elementary school.  
There are a few possible interpretations of this result. One is that having more LEPs 
drives schools to do a better job at monitoring and evaluating them for mainstreaming. Second, 
having more LEPs may enable schools to focus their instruction of the LEPs more effectively and 
as a result students exit LEP services faster. Third is that schools are simply overwhelmed with 
large numbers of LEPs, and thus due to limited resources, they mainstream LEPs faster. The first 
two items are likely to positively affect student achievement. The last item is likely to negatively 
affects it. Since there is evidence of improvement in math, so on net it seems that the positive 
effect outweighs the negative effect. 
1.5.3. Effect of Cohort LEP Share on Grade Retention 
Table 1.5 reports the reduced-form estimates of the effect of cohort LEP share on grade 
retention. I examine the effect on the probability of a student ever being retained since 1st grade or 
since their entrance into the district if the grade of entrance is after 1st grade. The table reports 
coefficients of cohort LEP share on the regression of a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ever-
LEP student was ever retained on the cohort LEP share. Under the preferred specification, a one 
23 
standard deviation or a 20-percentage point increase in cohort LEP share reduces the chances of 
ever-LEPs ever being retained by 2.5 percentage points for the sample limiting to 1st grade 
entrants though the effects are smaller for the full sample. It appears that the 1st grade entrants 
drive the effects on grade retention. One possible reason for this result may be that the restricted 
sample has less measurement error. The full sample consists of late entrants whose values on ever 
retained may contain measurement error since for the late entrants their pre-entry retentions are 
unknown.  
Overall within a school, students with a higher cohort LEP share are less likely to be 
retained. This finding is economically important, especially when considering the evidence 
suggesting retention is associated with likelihood of dropping out (Rumberger, 1987; Grissom, 
and Shepard, 1989; Fine, 1991; Roderick, 1994). Jacob and Lefgren (2009) find that retaining 
low-achieving 8th grade students in elementary school increases the probability that these students 
will drop out in high school. The finding is more substantial for the school district I study, as 95 
percent of my sample is Hispanic. The National Center for Education Statistics reports that the 
high school dropout rate among Hispanics was 17 percent in 2009, and that Hispanic high school 
dropout rate is the highest among all five ethnic groups.25 
This negative effect on grade retention may be a result of constrained resources. Due to 
having more LEPs, schools may not have enough resources to retain students to ensure maximum 
learning. Or maybe having more LEPs enables schools to focus their instruction of the LEPs more 
effectively. The first possibility is negative. The second is positive. Since there is evidence that 
math achievement increases, so it appears that the positive effect outweighs the negative effect. 
                                                      
25 See http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16. 
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1.5.4. Heterogeneity in Effect of Cohort LEP Share by Student and School 
Characteristics 
Next, I examine heterogeneity in the effect of cohort LEP share by student 
characteristics. To do this, I divide the samples into subsamples and analyze the effect of cohort 
LEP share on student outcomes separately. I divide my samples into two subsamples according to 
five different characteristics: (1) whether a student is female or male, (2) whether a student is a 
recent immigrant or not, (3) whether the school’s mean economic disadvantage is above the 
sample’s median or not, (4) whether the school’s mean enrollment is above the sample’s median 
enrollment, and (5) whether the student’s composite initial achievement is above the sample’s 
median composite initial achievement or not. A student composite initial achievement was 
calculated by taking an average of the student’s standardized scores in math, reading and 
language. When looking at the heterogeneity of the effect of cohort LEP share on student 
achievement I use the full sample of all ever-LEP 5th graders who have been in the district at least 
a year. With the mainstreaming and grade retention outcomes, the sample is restricted to 1st grade 
entrants. 
The estimates reported in Table 1.6 come from the preferred specification, which 
includes controls, school fixed effects, and school specific trends. The effects of cohort LEP share 
on student achievement are insignificant for reading and language scores for all subsamples, 
except for the subsample of schools having mean enrollment greater than the sample’s median 
enrollment. However, it appears that the significant effects of cohort LEP share on math scores 
are more pronounced for males, recent immigrants, students from poorer schools, students in 
larger schools, and students with higher initial composite achievement.  
With the mainstreaming and retention outcomes, there appear to be three noticeable 
differences in the effect of cohort LEP share. One is that the effects on mainstreaming and 
retention are higher for schools with more low socio-economic status students. Secondly, the 
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effect of cohort LEP share on retention is higher for students from smaller schools. Thirdly, the 
effect of cohort LEP share on retention is larger for students with lower initial achievement. The 
findings suggest two things. One is that the poorer schools appear to drive the effect of cohort 
LEP share on math scores, mainstreaming, and retention. Secondly, while the effect on 
mainstreaming differs by initial achievements, the effect on retention is much higher for students 
with lower initial achievement, who are likely to be the marginal students. 26 
1.5.5. Investigating Mechanisms of the Effects of Cohort LEP Share 
I find strong evidence of cohort LEP share on ever-LEP students’ educational outcomes. 
What are the specific mechanisms underlying these effects? Section 1.2.1 discussed some 
potential mechanisms and in this section I empirically investigate a few of them. One possibility 
is that my estimates of peer effects may pick up effects from BE/ESL programs. After all, it is the 
practice in the district to assign students to either the BE or the ESL program upon LEP 
identification. Thus, cohorts having higher cohort LEP shares may experience expansion to or 
improvement of BE and ESL programs, or differences in how students are assigned to the 
programs. To test this possibility, I run regressions of students’ initial BE/ESL statuses on cohort 
LEP share following the 4 specifications as in Table 1.3. These results are provided in Table 1.7. 
With student initial BE status, OLS reveals a positive correlation: higher cohort LEP share is 
positively associated with a higher probability of the student being in the BE program when 
he/she enters the data. However, this selection story disappears in subsequent specifications. 
Within-campus regressions suggest there is no significant relationship between cohort LEP share 
and students’ placement into BE/ESL program. In conclusion, there is little evidence to suggest 
that cohort LEP share affects student outcomes through differential assignment to BE and ESL 
programs. 
                                                      
26 When I run fully interacted models, I find the only statistically differences are the effects of cohort 
LEP share on retention for recent immigrants and others and for students whose composite initial 
achievement are above or below the sample’s median.  
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A second possibility is that the effects of cohort LEP share reflect peer achievement 
effects. Among LEPs there may be variations in achievement such that students’ educational 
outcomes can be impacted by their peers’ achievements. To test whether my findings on the 
effects of cohort LEP share pick up effects from peer achievement, I run a regression of the 
preferred specification with controls, school fixed effects, and school specific trends with the 
inclusion of initial peer achievement. Controls for initial peer achievement enter the regression 
through two variables: Initial peer achievement, which is the average of achievement in math, 
reading, and language of the student’s peers, and the share of peers who initially take the Stanford 
(English) math, reading, and language exam. Peers are students in the same grade minus the 
student. Table 1.8 reports the coefficients of cohort LEP share and initial peer achievements in 
column 2. Column 1 reports the findings from column 4 of Table 1.3. When controlling for peer 
initial achievements, coefficients on cohort LEP share are similar to the ones in the left column. 
Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that the effects of cohort LEP share come from peer 
achievement 
Lastly, one of the channels discussed above was the channel of English language 
acquisition. Using available data on the ratings of students’ English proficiency, I present results 
from OLS regressions of 5 separate ratings on cohort LEP share. The ratings are from 1 to 4, 
which translate to beginning, intermediate, advanced, and advanced high, respectively. Table 1.9 
reports the coefficients of cohort LEP share under 4 different specifications as in other tables. 
Under specification 1, higher cohort LEP share is associated with lower English proficiency, as 
suggested by the summary statistics in Table 1.1. However, under the preferred specification, 
there appears to be no significant relationships between cohort LEP share and student English 
proficiency ratings, except for the 10% significance level on the student reading rating. Thus, I do 
not find evidence to support that high cohort LEP share improves students’ English proficiency. 
Thus, differential English proficiency does not underlie the significant cohort LEP share effects 
that I find for math achievement, mainstreaming, and retention. 
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 1.5.6. Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Effect of Exposure to LEP 
Students on Student Achievement of Ever-LEP Students 
In the above sections, I have looked at the reduced-form effect of cohort LEP share on 
student outcome. In this section, I estimate the direct effect of exposure to LEPs on the outcome 
of ever-LEP students using sample of 5th graders who have been in the district for at least a year. 
My cumulative measure of 5th graders’ exposure to LEPs is the variable “average grade LEP 
share”. The variable gives the share of classmates in a grade classified as LEP averaged over the 
grades the student has been through in the district. As discussed in an earlier section, this measure 
is endogenous in the sense that schools’ unobservable factors affect both student outcomes and 
students being mainstreamed. Also, as argued above, cohort-to-cohort variation in LEP shares are 
idiosyncratic. Thus, if we can assume that cohort LEP share affects student outcomes only 
through “average grade LEP share”, then we can estimate the effect of “average grade LEP share” 
on student outcomes using 2SLS.27 
Panels A and B in Table 1.10 provide the OLS and 2SLS results of exposure to LEPs on 
student achievement respectively. In Panel A, even though regressions include school fixed 
effects and school specific time trends, the estimates can still be biased due to the endogeneity of 
the measure of average grade LEP share. When I apply 2SLS using cohort LEP share as the 
instrument, I find that the effects of exposure to LEPs are positive and significant for math scores 
and are positive but insignificant for reading and language scores. The 2SLS estimate on the math 
scores is higher compared to the reduced-form estimate. Numerically, a 20-percentage point 
increase in exposure to LEPs increases math scores by 0.07 of a standard deviation. The 2SLS 
estimates are scaled by the first-stage estimates, which are provided in Panel C. Here, we see that 
cohort LEP share is positively correlated with “average grade LEP share”. Specifically, a 20-
                                                      
27 As discussed in Section 1.3, it may be that cohort LEP share affects achievement through 
mechanisms other than exposure to LEPs. If the exclusion restriction is not valid, then the 2SLS estimates 
presented here are not consistent estimates of the effect of average LEP exposure. However, the reduced-
form analysis presented above is still correct, and reveals the causal effect of increasing LEP share in one’s 
cohort, even if we do not know the specific channels of this effect.  
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percentage point increase in cohort LEP share increases average grade LEP share by almost 8 
percentage points. 
1.6. Conclusion 
Using data from an urban school district, I estimate the effect of cohort LEP shares on the 
academic outcomes of LEPs themselves. I rely on idiosyncratic variation on the shares of LEPs 
across cohorts within a school that is off the school-specific trend to identify the effect. I find that 
the cohort LEP share has a positive and significant effect on the student achievement in 5th grade, 
particularly on the math scores. Higher cohort LEP share also increases mainstreaming of LEPs 
while reducing grade retention. 
While I do not have the data to look into all the mechanisms behind the estimated LEP 
peer effects, I have provided some evidence to support the conclusion that my estimates are not 
picking up effects from differential exposure to BE/ESL programs and peer achievement. I also 
find little to suggest that cohort LEP share affects students’ English proficiency. Additionally, it 
appears that poorer schools or schools with higher cohort LEP shares mainstream students faster 
and retain students less in response to higher LEP shares, and that positive effect of cohort LEP 
share on math is higher in poorer schools. Moreover, I find that while the effect of cohort LEP 
share on math scores seems to be higher in larger school, its effect on mainstreaming and grade 
retention appears to be larger for smaller schools. The claim that economies of scale may be a 
channel through which cohort LEP share affects LEPs’ outcomes can be questionable due to the 
differential effect depending on school enrollment. One of the channels that I am not able to 
examine is the teacher. Having more LEPs may allow teachers to focus their curriculum more to 
the needs of the LEPs. Not only that, in a district where the number of LEPs is consistently high, 
how a teacher teaches LEPs over time can matter as well. What current research suggests is that 
experience teaching LEPs is one of the most important factors in predicting a teacher’s 
effectiveness with future LEPs (Master, Loeb, Whitney, and Wyckoff, 2011).  
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Overall, my findings suggest that interactions among LEPs and concentration of LEPs 
affect their educational outcomes. One can even argue that for the LEPs, learning with other 
LEPs can have such a positive effect on their achievement that despite the schools’ policy of 
processing them through LEP services and elementary school faster, there is no evidence of 
negative effects on their achievement. The unexplored mechanisms of how cohort LEP share 
affects student outcomes may at the school level. 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent Variables - Stanford Achievement 
Test in 5th Grade
Stanford Math Standardized Scores 0.016 (0.917) -0.005 (0.896) 0.037 (0.936)
Stanford Reading Standardized Scores -0.205 (0.878) -0.252 (0.864) -0.157 (0.889)
Stanford Language Standardized Scores -0.153 (0.900) -0.201 (0.881) -0.105 (0.916)
Variables of Interest - Shares of LEP Students
Share of LEP Students in a 1st Grade - Cohort 
LEP Share 0.566 (0.197) 0.725 (0.087) 0.406 (0.137)
Average Shares of Currently LEP Students in a 
Grade 0.497 (0.178) 0.613 (0.116) 0.381 (0.151)
Control Variables 
Student Initial Achievment - Math 0.032 (0.995) 0.020 (0.988) 0.044 (1.002)
Student Initial Achievment - Reading 0.038 (0.983) 0.071 (0.973) 0.006 (0.992)
Student Initial Achievment - Language -0.003 (1.003) 0.013 (1.010) -0.018 (0.995)
Initial Math Exam was Stanford 0.210 (0.407) 0.151 (0.358) 0.268 (0.443)
Initial Reading Exam was Stanford 0.210 (0.407) 0.151 (0.358) 0.268 (0.443)
Initial Language Exam was Stanford 0.210 (0.407) 0.151 (0.358) 0.268 (0.443)
Female .496 (0.500) 0.499 (0.500) 0.493 (0.500)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.949 (0.220) 0.964 (0.185) 0.933 (0.250)
Special Education 0.072 (0.259) 0.067 (0.250) 0.078 (0.268)
Gifted 0.161 (0.368) 0.166 (0.372) 0.156 (0.363)
Recent Immigrant 0.178 (0.382) 0.183 (0.386) 0.173 (0.378)
Native American 0.000 (0.016) 0.000 (0.015) 0.000 (0.016)
Asian 0.035 (0.183) 0.031 (0.172) 0.039 (0.193)
Black 0.010 (0.098) 0.008 (0.087) 0.012 (0.108)
Hispanic 0.946 (0.227) 0.956 (0.205) 0.935 (0.247)
White 0.010 (0.099) 0.005 (0.073) 0.014 (0.119)
Other Information
Currently LEP 0.616 (0.486) 0.656 (0.475) 0.575 (0.494)
ESL 0.132 (0.338) 0.102 (0.302) 0.161 (0.368)
Bilingual 0.452 (0.498) 0.524 (0.499) 0.380 (0.485)
Number of Students in a School 536.772 (168.084) 565.174 (169.831) 508.409 (161.411)
Number of Currently-LEP Students in a School 279.804 (152.691) 348.593 (151.881) 211.108 (118.816)
Observations
C. ≤ Sample Median 
Cohort LEP Share
Table 1.1. Summary Statistics of the District's Ever-LEP 5th Graders from 1998-99 to 2009-10
Notes: The full sample consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders in the district who have been in the district at least a year with no
missing information. Panel B is restricted to observations with cohort LEP share above the full sample's median cohort LEP
share, and Panel C is restricted to observations with cohort LEP share equal to or below that figure. Stanford/Aprenda scores
are available from 1998-99 to 2009-10 and are standardized across grade and year over the entire student population in the
district. Student initial achievement comes from student scores in either the Stanford (English) or Aprenda (Spanish) exam
that the student took in the first year of entrance in the data. Variables "Initial (Math/Reading/Language) Exam was
Stanford" are dummies indicating if the student takes the Stanford (rather than the Aprenda) in his/her first year in the data. A
student is categorized as economically disadvantaged if the student is eligible for free or reduced lunch is classified, or is
classified as "other disadvantage" (7.8 % of the observations). The summary statistics for the control variables reported in the
table are for the sample with non-missing "Stanford Math standardized scores"; they are the similar to the samples with non-
missing Reading and Language Scores.
A. Full Sample
B. > Sample Median 
Cohort LEP Share
44,436 22,203 22,233
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
44,436 0.566 0.197 0.000 1.000
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
44,436 0.000 0.065 -0.432 0.423
Table 1.2. Variation in Cohort LEP Share
A. Raw Cohort LEP Share
B. Residuals after Removing School Fixed Effects and Trends
Notes: The sample consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders in the district who have been in the
district at least a year with no missing information.The residuals are calculated based on a
regression of cohort LEP share on student initial achievement, student characteristics, shares of
student characteristics in a grade and cohort, year dummies, school fixed effects and school-
specific time trends. 
Dependent Variable
Mean (S.D.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Math 0.016 -0.099 -0.097 0.076 0.126**
(0.917) (0.074) (0.137) (0.063) (0.056)
B. Reading -0.205 -0.216*** -0.119 0.051 0.066
(0.878) (0.061) (0.107) (0.062) (0.060)
C. Language -0.153 -0.191*** -0.121 -0.007 0.028
(0.900) (0.072) (0.125) (0.067) (0.061)
Observations 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436
Table 1.3. Reduced-Form Effects of Cohort LEP Share on Student Achievement
Notes: Sample consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders from school year 1998-99 to 2009-10 who have been
in the district at least a year with no missing information. A student's cohort is a group of students who
start 1st grade at the same school and year. For students who enter the district after 1st grade, which is about
15% of the sample, their cohort information comes from the cohort had they entered the district in 1st 
grade. Cohort LEP share is the share of students in a cohort who is LEP. Each coefficient reported comes
from a separate regression. Specification used in columns (1) controls for year fixed effects, student initial
achievement as well as student characteristics. Student initial achievement consists of student initial score
in Math, Reading, and Language, whether the initially student take the Stanford exam, and the
interactions of these indicators with the scores. Specification in columns (2) adds shares of student
characteristics in a grade and cohort to the preceding column's specification. Specification in columns (3)
adds campus fixed effects. Specification in columns (4) adds campus-specific time trends. Robust
standard errors clustered at the campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dep. Var. Mean (S.D.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 5: 1st Grade 4.306 0.015 -0.207 -0.193* -0.319***
   Entrants Only (1.460) (0.100) (0.161) (0.105) (0.099)
Observations 37,266 37,266 37,266 37,266 37,266
Dep. Var. Mean (S.D.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 2 0.092 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.096*
(0.289) (0.023) (0.035) (0.048) (0.054)
Observations 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449
Year 3 0.137 0.015 0.021 -0.010 0.011
(0.344) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) (0.027)
Observations 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449
Year 4 0.210 0.005 0.075 0.018 0.025
(0.407) (0.030) (0.046) (0.034) (0.032)
Observations 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449
Year 5 0.388 -0.091* -0.056 -0.056 0.002
(0.487) (0.047) (0.084) (0.056) (0.043)
Observations 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449 35,449
Table 1.4. Reduced-Form Effects of Cohort LEP Share on Mainstreaming
A. Years Classified as LEP in Elementary School
B. Probability of Being Mainstreamed
Notes: In Panel A, sample consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders from school year 1998-99 to 2009-10 who have
been in the data for at least a year and are 1st grade entrants. In Panel B, sample is restricted to the students who
were LEP in first grade. I follow these students for the next 4 years. Mainstreamed is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the student is no longer identified as LEP. The dependent variable in Panel A is the number of years the student
was classified as LEP. The dependent variable in Panel B is a dummy variable equals to zero. It becomes 1 when
the student is declassified and thereafter. Each coefficient reported comes from a separate regression. Specification
used in columns (1) controls for student initial achievement as well as student characteristics.Student initial
achievement consists of student initial score in Math, Reading, and Language, whether the initially student take the
Stanford exam, and  the interactions of these indicators with the scores.  Specification in columns (2) adds shares of 
student characteristics in a grade and cohort to the preceding column's specification. Specification in columns (3)
adds campus fixed effects. Specification in columns (4) ) adds campus-specific time trends. Robust standard errors
clustered at the campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dep. Var. Mean (S.D.) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 5: Full Sample 0.212 -0.018 -0.129*** -0.082** -0.096***
(0.409) (0.021) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035)
Observations 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436
Grade 5: 1st Grade 0.219 -0.023 -0.154*** -0.110*** -0.125***
   Entrants Only (0.414) (0.024) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039)
Observations 37,266 37,266 37,266 37,266 37,266
Table 1.5. Reduced-Form Effects of Cohort LEP Share on Grade Retention
Probability of Being Ever-Retained
Notes: Sample consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders from school year 1998-99 to 2009-10 who have been in the
data for at least a year with no missing information. The second row is restricted to those who are 1st grade
entrants. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the student was ever retained from first to fifth grade.
Each coefficient reported comes from a separate regression. Specification used in columns (1) controls for
student initial achievement as well as student characteristics. Student initial achievement consists of student
initial score in Math, Reading, and Language, whether the initially student take the Stanford exam, and the
interactions of these indicators with the scores. Specification in columns (2) adds shares of student
characteristics in a grade and cohort to the preceding column's specification. Specification in columns (3) adds
campus fixed effects. Specification in columns (4) adds campus-specific time trends. Robust standard errors
clustered at the campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.115*** 0.019 -0.044 -0.046 -0.201*** -0.018 0.034 0.028
(0.025) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) (0.032) (0.038) (0.039)
Observations 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436
Initial ESL
Table 1.7. Regressions of Student Initial ESL/Bilingual Status on Cohort LEP Share
Initial Bilingual
Notes: The sample consists of all ever-lep fifth graders in the district who have been in the district at
least a year with no missing information. Student initial Bilingual/ESL status is the Bilingual/ESL
status of the student when he/she first enters the data. The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (4) is
the dummy for initial placement into bilingual education, and the dependent variable in Columns (5)
to (8) is the dummy for initial placement into ESL. The reported coefficient is for the variable
"Cohort LEP Share", and each coefficient reported comes from a separate regression. Specification
used in columns (1) and (5) controls for student initial achievement as well as student characteristics.
Specification in columns (2) and (6) adds shares of student characteristics in a grade and cohort to the
preceding column's specification. Specification in columns (3) and (7) adds campus fixed effects.
Specification in columns (4) and (8) adds campus-specific time trends. Robust standard errors
clustered at the campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Preferred Specfication
Control for Peer 
Achievement
(1) (2)
Math 0.126** 0.118**
(0.056) (0.055)
Reading 0.066 0.058
(0.060) (0.060)
Language 0.028 0.019
(0.061) (0.061)
Observations 44,436 44,283
Notes: Sample consists ever-LEP fifth graders who have been with the district at least a
year with no missing information. Peer achievement is the average of peers' initial
achievement. The reported coefficient is for the variable "Cohort LEP Share".
Coefficients in the first collumn are from column (4) of Table 3, which are from the full
specification with all controls, campus fixed effects and campus time trends. Initial peer
achievement [average of peer achievement and share of peers who initially take
Stanford (English) Exam] is added to regressions that produce coefficients in column 2.
Robust standard errors clustered at campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 1.8. Examining the Effect of Cohort LEP Share on Student Achievement 
with Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Listening Rating -0.187 -0.300 0.013 0.016
(0.129) (0.213) (0.099) (0.093)
Observations 22,578 22,578 22,578 22,578
B. Speaking Rating -0.174 -0.272 -0.026 -0.053
(0.123) (0.203) (0.108) (0.101)
Observations 22,583 22,583 22,583 22,583
C. Writing Rating -0.185* -0.242 -0.032 -0.078
(0.102) (0.169) (0.116) (0.110)
Observations 22,514 22,514 22,514 22,514
D. Reading Rating -0.074 -0.075 0.128 0.130*
(0.056) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077)
Observations 22,703 22,703 22,703 22,703
E. Composite Rating -0.110* -0.155* 0.073 0.065
(0.061) (0.087) (0.077) (0.077)
Observations 22,299 22,299 22,299 22,299
Notes: The sample consists of all ever-lep fifth graders in the district who
have been in the district at least a year with English proficiency ratings and
other information available. The dependent variables are the ratings on
students’ language domains of listening, speaking, reading, writing and a
composite rating that is determined from the ratings on the four language
domains. The ratings arefrom 1 to 4, which translates to beginning,
intermediate, advanced, and advanced high, respectively. The reported
coefficient is for the variable "Cohort LEP Share", and each coefficient
reported comes from a separate regression. Specification used in columns
(1) controls for student initial achievement as well as student
characteristics. Specification in columns (2) adds shares of student
characteristics in a grade and cohort to the preceding column's
specification. Specification in columns (3) adds campus fixed effects.
Specification in columns (4) adds campus-specific time trends. Robust
standard errors clustered at the campus level are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 1.9. Relationship between Cohort LEP Share and Student English Proficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Math -0.256*** -0.398*** 0.047 0.161* -0.139 -0.146 0.187 0.326**
(0.081) (0.126) (0.093) (0.082) (0.100) (0.200) (0.153) (0.143)
B. Reading -0.433*** -0.393*** 0.058 0.195*** -0.303*** -0.179 0.125 0.171
(0.065) (0.099) (0.077) (0.072) (0.078) (0.153) (0.151) (0.154)
C. Language -0.449*** -0.496*** -0.086 0.105 -0.267*** -0.182 -0.018 0.073
(0.077) (0.121) (0.079) (0.072) (0.094) (0.180) (0.164) (0.157)
44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436
0.715*** 0.665*** 0.407*** 0.386***
(0.029) (0.043) (0.012) (0.010)
44,436 44,436 44,436 44,436
Table 1.10. Effects of Exposure to LEP Students on Student Achievement of Ever-LEP Students
A. OLS Estimates
Notes: The sample in all panels consists of all ever-LEP fifth graders in the district who have been in the district at
least a year with no missing information. Each coefficient represents a separate regression. Panel A provides OLS
estimates of the correlation between student average grade LEP share and student achievement. Panel B provides
2SLS estimates with 'average grade LEP share" as the endogenous regressor and "cohort LEP share" ad the
identifying instrument. Variable "average grade LEP share" gives the share of classmates in a grade classified as
LEP averaged over the grades the student has been in the district. Cohort LEP share is the share of students in a
cohort who is LEP. Panel C provides coefficients of cohort LEP share from regressions of student average grade
LEP share on cohort LEP share. Specification used in column (1) & (5) controls for student initial achievementas
well as student characteristics. Specification in column (2) & (6) adds shares of student characteristics in a grade
and cohort. Specification in column (3) & (7) adds campus fixed effects. Specification in column (4) & (8) adds
campus specific time trends. Robust standard errors clustered at campus level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
B. 2SLS Estimates 
C. First-Stage
(Coefficients for Cohort LEP Share)
Observations
Observations
Taking Aprenda in 
1st grade
Fraction Taking 
Aprenda again in 
2nd grade
Fraction Taking 
Aprenda again in 
3rd grade
Fraction Taking 
Aprenda again in 
4th grade
Fraction Taking 
Aprenda again in 
5th grade
Math 75,597 0.754 0.580 0.286 0.007
Reading 75,692 0.755 0.580 0.286 0.007
Language 75,598 0.754 0.580 0.286 0.007
Table 1.A1.Transition Matrix of Students Taking Aprenda Exam in 1st Grade
Notes: Sample consitsts of students from grade 1-5 from school year 1998-99 to 2009-10. 
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Taking Stanford -Math 0.204 0.176 0.204 0.430 0.827
Taking Stanford  - Reading 0.204 0.176 0.204 0.430 0.827
Taking Stanford - Lang 0.204 0.176 0.204 0.430 0.827
Taking Aprenda  - Math 0.751 0.783 0.755 0.530 0.125
Taking Aprenda - Reading 0.752 0.783 0.756 0.530 0.126
Taking Aprenda  - Lang 0.751 0.783 0.755 0.530 0.126
Notes: Sample consists of students from grade 1-5 from school year 1998-99 to 2009-10. 
Table 1.A2. Shares of LEP Students Taking Stanford/Aprenda Achievement Exam
Fraction being 
Mainstreamed
Grade 2 0.082
Grade 3 0.122
Grade 4 0.200
Grade 5 0.396
Table 1.A3.Transition Matrix of LEP Students to Mainstreamed Classes
Notes: Sample consitsts of observations of students who are LEP in
first grade, observing them in grade 2-5 from school year 1998-99 to
2009-10. 
Number of students who were LEP 
in 1st grade
75,405
62,082
51,388
40,987
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
         
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         
          
      




 
          
     
             
              


                
               
                

   


 
     


         

            

 
          
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

 



                
      
 

             


 
           




             
               
           


       

            
             
              

           
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Figure 2.1: Gifted and Talented Matrix for GT Entry in 2008-09 
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Gifted in 
2009-10 (7th Grade)
Not Gifted in 
2009-10
Not in Sample in
2009-10
In GT Magnet in 
2009-10
Not in GT Magnet in 
2009-10
Not in Sample in 
2009-10
Female 0.54 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.57
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Economically Disadvantaged 0.59 0.89 0.81 0.24 0.41 0.17
(0.49) (0.31) (0.39) (0.43) (0.49) (0.37)
LEP 0.23 0.37 0.28 0.02 0.06 0.04
(0.42) (0.48) (0.45) (0.15) (0.24) (0.20)
Asian 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.16 0.19
(0.31) (0.13) (0.18) (0.45) (0.37) (0.39)
Black 0.13 0.28 0.33 0.12 0.21 0.18
(0.34) (0.45) (0.47) (0.32) (0.41) (0.38)
Hispanic 0.52 0.66 0.56 0.22 0.23 0.14
(0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.41) (0.42) (0.35)
White 0.24 0.04 0.09 0.38 0.40 0.50
(0.43) (0.19) (0.28) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
Gifted 0.68 0.06 0.15 0.85 0.85 0.83
(0.47) (0.25) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37)
Stanford Math 0.74 0.06 0.18 1.61 1.39 1.72
(0.59) (0.39) (0.47) (0.79) (0.71) (1.03)
Stanford Reading 0.64 -0.02 0.11 1.72 1.60 1.83
(0.41) (0.39) (0.47) (0.78) (0.77) (0.87)
Stanford Language 0.74 -0.16 0.01 1.61 1.48 1.83
(0.59) (0.57) (0.67) (0.84) (0.76) (0.94)
Stanford Social Science 0.43 -0.61 -0.42 1.52 1.48 1.75
(0.68) (0.68) (0.80) (0.86) (0.84) (0.91)
Stanford Science 0.50 -0.50 -0.30 1.47 1.36 1.61
(0.66) (0.65) (0.76) (0.89) (0.79) (0.95)
Disciplinary Infractions 0.04 0.21 0.25 0.02 0.05 0.01
(0.26) (0.73) (0.87) (0.15) (0.24) (0.10)
Attendence Rate 98.26 97.25 96.58 98.35 97.98 97.00
(2.35) (4.52) (4.95) (2.00) (2.34) (3.75)
Stanford Math 1.11 -0.40 - 1.70 1.53 -
(0.45) (0.41) - (0.84) (0.86) -
Stanford Reading 0.95 -0.31 - 1.66 1.58 -
(0.37) (0.38) - (0.66) (0.72) -
Stanford Language 1.08 0.17 - 1.59 1.44 -
(0.57) (0.58) - (0.80) (0.72) -
Stanford Social Science 0.88 -0.09 - 1.70 1.51 -
(0.64) (0.60) - (0.88) (0.80) -
Stanford Science 1.00 -0.18 - 1.72 1.36 -
(0.79) (0.71) - (0.94) (0.77) -
Disciplinary Infractions 0.28 1.25 - 0.05 0.13 -
(1.11) (2.61) - (0.24) (0.86) -
Attendence Rate 97.37 95.02 - 97.84 97.57 -
(3.19) (6.13) - (2.52) (3.16) -
Observations 1,919 8,748 3,652 291 149 102
Table 2.1. Characteristics of  Students Evaluated for Middle School GT in 2007-08
B. GT Magnet Lottery Sample
Standard deviations in parentheses. Achievement is measured in standard deviation units within grade and year across the district. Disciplinary infractions are the number of
times a student is given a suspension or more severe punishment. Economically disadvantaged refers to students who qualify for free lunch, reduced-price lunch or another
federal or state anti-poverty program.
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Math Reading Language
Social 
Studies  Science
Disciplinary 
Infractions
Attendance 
Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.422*** 0.120 0.007 0.246** 0.146 0.305* -0.445 -0.565
(0.064) (0.112) (0.071) (0.111) (0.135) (0.159) (0.505) (1.253)
Observations 2,609 2,597 2,600 2,596 2,594 2,597 2,650 2,649
0.371*** 0.057 -0.029 0.276 -0.019 0.409 -0.617 -0.455
(0.103) (0.238) (0.157) (0.203) (0.244) (0.332) (0.745) (2.036)
Observations 2,609 2,597 2,600 2,596 2,594 2,597 2,650 2,649
0.460*** -0.014 0.007 0.041 0.009 0.023 0.067 -1.039*
(0.057) (0.037) (0.041) (0.065) (0.065) (0.112) (0.249) (0.600)
Observations 2,609 2,597 2,600 2,596 2,594 2,597 2,650 2,649
0.456*** -0.027 0.003 0.013 -0.004 0.029 0.068 -1.186*
(0.061) (0.048) (0.044) (0.067) (0.068) (0.108) (0.263) (0.684)
Observations 2,538 2,526 2,528 2,525 2,522 2,525 2,577 2,576
0.892*** -0.024 0.003 0.135 0.003 -0.049 -0.433 -1.057
(0.317) (0.081) (0.059) (0.101) (0.100) (0.128) (0.505) (0.923)
Observations 1,295 1,288 1,290 1,287 1,287 1,288 1,312 1,311
1.028** 0.042 -0.069 0.082 -0.011 0.046 -0.008 -1.064
(0.510) (0.099) (0.066) (0.122) (0.121) (0.169) (0.296) (0.941)
Observations 1,314 1,309 1,310 1,309 1,307 1,309 1,339 1,339
0.391*** 0.116 -0.097 0.132 -0.029 0.338 -0.762 -0.835
(0.085) (0.167) (0.111) (0.159) (0.170) (0.246) (0.518) (1.647)
Observations 849 845 848 845 842 844 860 859
0.462*** 0.005 0.014 0.111 0.056 0.115 -0.162 -0.638
(0.056) (0.058) (0.046) (0.072) (0.080) (0.103) (0.325) (0.758)
Observations 2,057 2,047 2,052 2,047 2,044 2,047 2,084 2,083
0.472*** -0.009 0.018 -0.013 0.007 0.019 0.001 -0.823
(0.055) (0.039) (0.036) (0.057) (0.063) (0.086) (0.209) (0.549)
Observations 3,178 3,162 3,163 3,158 3,158 3,160 3,222 3,220
0.488*** -0.022 0.009 -0.015 -0.022 0.017 0.100 -0.438
(0.055) (0.035) (0.030) (0.045) (0.061) (0.077) (0.179) (0.497)
Observations 3,756 3,735 3,736 3,731 3,729 3,733 3,806 3,804
- 0.073 0.000 0.019 0.056 0.222 1.476 -0.434
- (0.117) (0.072) (0.186) (0.080) (0.177) (1.002) (1.203)
Observations - 1,075 1,078 708 2,044 1,074 429 1,092
Bandwidth for LLR (from Leave-One-Out
 Cross Validation)
- 5 5 3 8 5 2 5
(12)
- -0.020 0.021 0.006 -0.018 0.019 0.032 13.509
- (0.048) (0.047) (0.067) (0.068) (0.105) (0.240) (16.494)
- -0.029 -0.056 0.009 0.024 -0.054 -0.329 -0.149
- (0.049) (0.047) (0.030) (0.041) (0.046) (0.334) (0.165)
Observations - 2,597 2,600 2,596 2,594 2,597 2,650 2,649
Interacting GT Impacts with Lagged Dependent Variable
Enrolled in GT
Enrolled in GT * 5th Grade Dep Var
(5) Limit to Students Who Have 16 or More Stanford and 
10 or More NNAT Points
(6) Limit to Students Who  Less than 16 Stanford or 10 
NNAT Points
(11)
(7) Distance Between -4 & 4
(10) Distance Between -16 & 16
(9)
Achievement is measured in standard deviations of scale scores within grade and year. Disciplinary infractions are the number of infractions warranting a suspension or more severe
punishment per year. Controls for race, gender, economic disadvantage, LEP, prior gifted status and lagged (5th grade) dependent varable included and a linear smoother with a slope shift
above the cutoff except where noted.. Sample is limited to students with Euclidean distances from qualifying via the GT qualification matrix of between -10 and 10. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by 7th grade school.
First Stage
Table 2.4. 2SLS Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Impact of Receiving GT Services
Specification Checks
Local Linear Regressions 
with Rectangular Kernel
(3) Add Middle School Fixed Effects
Stanford Achievement Test
Distance Between -12 & 12
Limited to Observations With 
No Missing Matrix Data
Distance Between -8 & 8
Quadratic Smoother
Cubic Smoother
(1)
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(4)
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Chapter 3 
Are Remittances in the Hands of Women 
more Effective? Evidence from Vietnam 
(with Adriana Kugler)1 
3.1. Introduction 
International migration more than doubled in the past four decades, reaching 190 million in the 
late 2000s. Close to half of all international migrants come from the developing world and more 
than half of them are women, with 65% of all international migrants living in high-income 
countries. 
 Not surprisingly, international migration has been accompanied by a sharp rise in 
remittances, i.e., monetary transfers from migrants, back to their home countries. By 1997, 
international financial flows from remittances had surpassed overseas development assistance and 
by 2008 they were estimated to have reached 300 billion dollars. The evidence on the impact that 
remittances in terms of improving the lives of those left behind in their home country shows 
mostly positive effects. Some studies find that remittances contribute to the development of 
regions and households in the sending countries by improving health outcomes and increasing 
investment in education and capital (e.g., Cox and Ureta (2001), Yang (2008), Lopez-Cordova 
(2005), Gibson and McKenzie (2010)). However, a number of studies find negative impacts from 
the migration of household members on those remaining behind. For example, Gibson, McKenzie 
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and Stillman (2011) find that those left behind in the Pacific Islands are generally worse after the 
migration of other household members and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find that migration by 
household members in Mexico reduces educational attainment and attendance. 
 In this chapter we examine the impact of remittances on investments and the composition 
of spending in Vietnam and ask whether the impact of remittances depends on the gender of the 
person who receives the monetary transfer from the migrant. Under the unitary model of the 
household, household expenditure allocations should be independent of whether a man or woman 
in the household controls the money. On the other hand, if household decisions deviate from the 
unitary household model, then increases in the control of monetary resources within the 
household, say from increased remittances, will strengthen an individual’s bargaining power and 
will change the allocation of expenditures. There is evidence from a number of countries that 
increased resources controlled by women at the time of marriage increases expenditure shares for 
education and health care (e.g., Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000), Thomas (1994), Hallman 
(2000) and Duflo (2003)). Here we ask whether increased control of remittances by women 
changes the allocation of expenditures and decisions within the household. 
 We use the Living Standards Measurement Surveys for Vietnam for 1992 and 1997 to 
examine the differential impact of remittances on household members when women control 
remittances. The empirical challenge to estimating the effects of remittances on households' 
outcomes comes from the fact that remittances and the fraction of remittances going to women 
may be endogenous. To address potential biases in the effects of remittances, we follow an 
instrumental variables strategy. Our instruments are regional migration rates coming from the 
1992 survey and the interaction between this variable and the share of women in the household. 
Thus, our data sample for analysis come from the 1997 survey, while the instrument is derived 
from the earlier survey. OLS results shows that the amount of remittances is associated with 
improved health, less adult employment, and increased business equipment. In addition, OLS 
results show that the greater fraction of remittances going to women, the greater educational 
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attainment of children in the household, the less employment for the young and adult, the less 
investment in businesses, the less household expenditure on food, and the higher the spending in 
health. However, our instrumental variables results show more limited effects. 2SLS results show 
a positive effect of remittances on household expenditure on education, but a negative effect on 
household expenditures on food items. Moreover, an increase in the share of remittances going to 
women increases household expenditures on health. 
 Our results, thus, suggest that not only do the amount of remittances affect investments, but 
that the gender of the receiver is also important in terms of how remittances affect households. 
The fact that whether a woman or a man receives the remittances matters in terms of households’ 
decisions is inconsistent with unitary models of the household. To our knowledge, only two 
studies have examined the differential effects by the gender of remittance receivers. Guzman, 
Morrison and Sjoblom (2008) report results from simple OLS regressions and find that 
remittances going to female-headed household increase expenditures in health and education in 
Ghana. Gobel (2011) finds that female-headed households that receive remittances spend more on 
education and health and less on investment using household data from Ecuador. However, unlike 
our analysis, these studies only look at spending and do not examine other outcomes such as 
actual investments in human capital and equipment or on labor market outcomes.  
3.2. Related Literature 
 The literature examining the impact of remittances has evolved from aggregate studies 
towards studies based on household and individual data. Adams and Page (2005) estimate the 
impact of remittances on poverty. Using data from 71 developing countries, they find that a rise 
in remittances reduces the share of those living in poverty, where remittances are instrumented 
with the distance from the remittance-sending area. Lopez-Cordova (2005) conducts a regional 
study for Mexico using the interaction between distance to the U.S. and historical migration as an 
instrument and finds that an increase in the fraction of households receiving remittances in a 
	  
	  
90 
municipality reduces infant mortality and child illiteracy and increases school attendance. 
 More recent studies have relied on individual-level data. A study by Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta (2003) uses the 1997 Annual household Survey from El Salvador to examine the impact of 
remittances on school attainment and controls for an indicator of whether the household received 
a remittance as a way to proxy for omitted variables. While the paper is not able to control for all 
omitted variables, the study finds that the probability of leaving school is lower when remittances 
increase. Acosta (2006) also uses data from El Salvador but instead uses matching techniques and 
finds that children in remittance receiving households have higher school attendance and lower 
employment than those in non-receiving households. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and Borraz 
(2005) both use the 2000 Mexican Census and the interaction between the state migration rate 
and household characteristics and between the state migration rate and distance to the U.S. as 
instruments. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) find that remittances increase schooling overall, but 
Borraz (2005) finds that remittances only help to increase schooling in rural areas. Using GMM, 
Acosta et al. (2008) examine the impact of remittances using household data from 10 Latin 
American countries and find that remittances have negative but small effects on inequality and 
poverty. Finally, a study by Yang (2003) for the Philippines uses exchange rate shocks during the 
period of the Asian crisis and finds that an increase in remittances: raises school-related and 
investment-related expenditures, children’s schooling, and the likelihood that a household enters 
an entrepreneurial activity. A recent paper by Gibson and McKenzie (2010) instead relies on 
matched difference-in-differences and finds that remittances from migrants to New Zealand 
increased income and consumption of more durable goods as well as child schooling in Tonga. 
However, another study looking at Pacific islanders by Gibson, McKenzie and Stillman (2011) 
finds that the absence of individuals allowed to migrate to New Zealand on the basis of a lottery 
has mostly negative impacts on those household members left behind. Similarly, McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2010) find lower schooling for young individuals in households with migrants in 
Mexico. 
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 While the most reliable studies based on instrumental variables and matched difference- in-
difference methods find positive effects of remittances on health, schooling and investments, 
none of these studies examines the differential impact of remittances going to women and men. A 
growing literature tests the unitary household model, i.e. testing whether household acts as one 
rational decision maker, in the context of developing countries. There is evidence that money in 
the hands of women has different effect on the outcomes of households' members compared to 
money in the hands of men. A number of studies find that unearned income in the hands of 
mothers increases education and health of children. Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) find that 
women’s assets at the time of marriage increase expenditure shares in education in Bangladesh 
and South Africa. Thomas (1990) finds that unearned income in the hands of mothers improves 
health of all children in Brazil, but Thomas (1994) finds that mothers’ education has greater 
effects on daughters’ height and fathers’ education has a greater effect in sons’ heights in Brazil 
and Ghana. Similarly, Hallman (2000) also finds that mothers’ assets reduce daughters’ morbidity 
while assets of fathers improve sons’ health in Bangladesh. Duflo (2003) also documents gender 
asymmetries and finds that cash transfers to women have a positive impact on girls’ weight for 
height and height for age measures but not on boys. 
 While many studies have shown evidence against the unitary model of the household in 
developing world few studies have examined the differential impact of remittances on households 
when women receive these remittances. Only Guzman, Morrison and Sjoblom (2008) and Gobel 
(2011) have examined the differential effects of remittances when received by a female vs. a 
male-headed household. Both of these studies look only at expenditures and find that remittances 
received by female-headed households raise the share of expenditures in health and education in 
Ghana and Ecuador. While Gobel tries to instrument for the amount of remittances, Guzman, 
Morrison and Sjoblom’s (2008) data from Ghana does not allow them to use either matching or 
instrumental variables to deal with the endogeneity of remittances. 
 Furthermore, a recent review by Dean Yang in 2011 outlines exciting new research in the 
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area of migrant remittances besides that of the impact of remittances on receiving households. 
Particularly, Yang (2011) reviews literature on how much control migrants have over the money 
sent home or if they desire any control at all. This literature is similar to our study as they also 
examine the intra-household resource allocation. He reviews two studies. Ashraf, Aycinena, 
Martinez, and Yang (2011) conduct a randomized controlled trial among migrants from El 
Salvador living and working in the Washington, D.C. metro area. They find that migrants were 
more likely to open savings accounts when offered the option of greater control of the accounts. 
Chin, Karkoviata, and Wilcox (2010) study the effect of assistance of obtaining U.S. bank 
accounts on opening bank accounts and saving among Hispanic immigrants. They find that those 
assigned to the treatment experienced increased opening of U.S. bank accounts and higher 
savings in the United States and reduced remittances to Mexico. The effects are larger among 
those who report to have “no control” over how remittances are used in Mexico. These two 
papers study differential resource allocation between migrants and family members back home. 
 Here, we explore whether the effects of remittances differ with the gender of the receiver of 
the remittances in Vietnam. Contrary to the two previous studies that have looked at this question, 
we not only examine the impact on household expenditures but we also examine impacts on 
schooling, health, and labor market and investment outcomes. In addition, we address the 
endogeneity of remittances by providing instruments for both the amount of remittances as well 
as the share of remittances going to women.  
3.3. Data 
 We use data from the Vietnamese Living Standards Surveys (VLSS) for the years 1992 and 
1997. The Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment along with the General Statistical 
Office (GSO) conducted the first VLSS between September 1992 and October 1993. GSO 
conducted the second survey between December 1997 and December 1998. These surveys were 
part of the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys conducted in various 
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developing countries, with technical assistance from the World Bank. The surveys include 
information on the communities and the households. In our analysis, we focus on the household 
questionnaires, which collect information on demographic information characteristics, 
educational attainment, anthropometric measures, labor market activities, and place of residence. 
Most importantly, the surveys include detailed questions on the total amount of remittances from 
different sources, as well as the identity and location of the sender of the remittances and the 
identity of the receiver of the remittances. The data collector was asked first to list the names of 
the remitters, then correspondingly ask to write the down the ID code of the family member that 
received the money from each remitter. 
 The 1992 sample includes 4800 households and the 1997 sample includes the original 4800 
households and an additional 1200 households, which were selected from the total sample of the 
1995 Multi-Purpose Household Survey of the GSO. Our data sample of analysis comes from the 
1997 sample. Specifically, we construct the variables using the answers to sample questionnaires 
by household members or representatives of households. Our education variables are the variable 
on the number of years of school a person has completed and whether the person currently attends 
school. Unfortunately, the questionnaires do not ask for the length of time the person takes to 
finish a certain grade. Only for education beyond high school do we know the time to completion. 
As a result, the former education variable assumes the person takes 1 year to finish each grade. 
Our labor market outcomes include whether the person was employed in the past 12 months and 
monthly salary of the job worked in the past 12 months. Our health variable is the person’s body 
mass index (BMI), which is calculated as the person’s weight in kilogram divided by the person’s 
height in meter squared. Expenditures and total remittances a household received in the past 12 
months are expressed in hundred thousand VN Dongs. We transform monetary values into real 
Dongs by deflating these with the 1997 regional and monthly CPIs.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As of April 30, 2012, according to www.xe.com, 1USD equals to 20,800VND.  
	  
	  
94 
 Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables for the various age sub-samples we 
consider in our analysis: young, adults, and older individuals. Individuals in remittance-receiving 
households in all age groups have more educated parents, are more likely to live in urban areas, 
and have higher schooling and attendance than those not receiving remittances. Of course, these 
differences should not be interpreted as causal. In fact, differences in parental schooling and 
urbanization may indicate self-selection into migration and remittance receipt and highlight the 
importance of controlling for these variables. Table 3.1 also shows that remittance-receiving 
households spend more, even though these households are on average smaller. In terms of the 
total of remittances, remittance-receiving households on average receive more than 40 hundred 
thousand VND in the past 12 months. This accounts for more than 20% of the annual household 
expenditures. Female household members receive roughly half of this total amount.  
3.4. Empirical Framework 
 Remittances as extra income would relax liquidity constraints, allowing households to 
smooth consumption and invest in schooling, health and businesses. At the same time, having 
family members working elsewhere may disrupt family life that may bring about negative effect 
to outcomes of individual members and of households. For example, the absence of the mother or 
father may disrupt a child's school. Or the absence of the mother or father may also put pressure 
on the children to leave school and to earn money when there are no remittances. It is important 
to note, however, that in our 1997 survey, less than 2% of the remitters are wives/husbands of the 
receivers, while more than 48% of the remitters are children of the receivers. More than 20% of 
the remitters are sisters/brothers of the receivers. 
 The basic regression describing the relationship between total household remittances and 
individual outcomes is 
€ 
Yijk = βR jk + ρS jk +ΨXijk +ΩZ jk +Γregionk +ε ijk  , (1) 
where is the outcome of interest of individual i in household j in region k. Rjk is the total amount 
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of remittances received by household j in region k, and Sjk is share of remittances going to women 
in the household j in region k. Vector Xijk contains the individual characteristics such as age and 
sex and the mother's and father's number of years of schooling. Vector Zjk contains household 
characteristics, which includes whether the household is in urban or rural area, whether the 
household is female-headed, and size of the household. Vector regionk includes the regional-level 
controls, which are the proportion of the population living under the poverty line and the 
proportion of rural households in the region without allocated land. The World Bank estimated 
these two variables based on the 1992 survey (World Bank, 1999). However, we do not include 
such variables from the 1997 survey as migration itself can affect the regions’ poverty and 
landless rates. Parameter εijk is the individual error term, which may be correlated within 
households. Thus, we cluster standard errors at household level for individual-level regressions. 
We also estimate similar regressions for the household outcomes, but which do not control for 
individual characteristics. 
 The regressions above will provide us with relationships between total household 
remittances and the share of remittances received by women and the outcomes of interest, but the 
estimate on the total of remittances will not be causal. In particular, households receiving 
remittances may also be more likely to send children to school, to spend more money on 
healthcare and to invest in businesses. That is, observable and unobservable factors related with 
the receipt of remittances may also correlate with the outcomes of interest, which would bias the 
effects of remittances. We control for factors such as whether the household lives in an urban or 
rural area, region-level controls and the educational attainment of the mother and the father. 
However, unobservable factors such as motivation and drive may also be related to both the 
amount of remittances and investments. Likewise, the fraction of the remittances received by 
women in the household may be related to other factors. If the bargaining power of women in the 
household determines what fraction of the remittances women get, then this would capture 
exactly what we are interested in and there would be no bias. However, if other factors are 
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determining the fraction going to women and are also related to outcomes, then we would be 
getting biased results of these effects as well. 
 To establish a causal relationship between total household remittances and outcomes of 
interest, we rely on instrumental variables. Following Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and 
Hildebrandt and McKenzie (2005), one of our instruments is the migration rate from the 1992 
survey. Specifically, it is calculated as follows: 
€ 
1992_MigrationRatek =
Num _Migrantsk
Num _Peoplek
, (2) 
Where Num _ Peoplek is the number of remittance senders in the region k and and Num _ Peoplek 
is the number of people in the region as they are calculated from the 1992 survey. There are 7 
regions in Vietnam. From the survey questionnaires, migrants include internal migrants and those 
who work overseas as well as those who have settled permanently in another country. 
Specifically, in the 1992 survey, less than 20% of the remittance senders are living outside of 
Vietnam. Regarding the internal migration, the doi moi (renovation) program of the late 1980s 
has been the driving force behind the shift from organized to spontaneous migration in Vietnam 
(Niimi, Pham, and Reilly, 2009). According to Dang et al. (2003), there are three reasons for that 
change. The doi moi policy (1) rendered farmers less tied to the land from the de-collectivization 
in the agricultural sector, (2) the opening of the economy has allowed people to be less dependent 
on government subsidies, and (3) the increased flow of foreign direct investment into Vietnam 
has attracted migrants from various regions of the country to certain regions that have been the 
main recipients of these investments (e.g. the Southeast region).  Additionally, it is suggestive in 
Small, Truong, and Vuong (2008) that the number of Vietnamese leaving Vietnam during 
different time periods depended on the region’s connection to the political and legal 
circumstances. Thus, different regions have different migration rates. Furthermore, to satisfy the 
identifying assumption, the 1992 migration rate must not affect the outcomes through other 
factors, but only through the total remittances that households receive. We argue that by 
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controlling for the regions’ characteristics in 1992, we hold constant the regions’ persistent 
economic conditions that might have resulted in higher or lower migration out of the regions and 
differential individual and household outcomes. 
 In addition, the share of remittances received by women may also be endogenous, so we 
use the interaction between historical migration rate and the share of women in the household. 
The idea is that if there are more women in the household, remittances may just have to go to 
them. Overall, to identify parameters, 
€ 
β and 
€ 
ρ  in equation (1), we use the 1992 migration rates 
and the interaction of this variable with the share of women in the household as the instrumental 
variables. Our first-stage regressions are thus: 
€ 
R jk = π01992_MigrationRatek +π11992_MigrationRatek × Share_Women jk +ΣZ jk +ν jk  
€ 
S jk = δ01992_MigrationRatek +δ11992_MigrationRatek × Share_Women jk +ΛZ jk +υ jk  
(3) 
Then, we estimate the following 2SLS regression: 
€ 
Yijk = φ ˆ R jk +θ ˆ S jk +ΦXijk + ΔZ jk +Πregionk +ε ijk , (4) 
where and 
€ 
ˆ R and 
€ 
ˆ S  are the predicted values from equations (3). 
3.5. Results 
 Table 3.2 provides first-stage results for different samples used in OLS and IV regressions. 
For outcome variables that have the same samples of data, their first-stage results are the same 
and are not provided. All specifications contain whether household is in an urban area, household 
size, whether female heads the household, mother's and fathers' number of years of education, and 
1992 region-level variables, which are the poverty rate and the rate of landlessness among rural 
households in the region. The individual-level regressions also contain information on the 
person's sex and age. Dependent variable in specifications on the two left columns of each panel 
is total of remittances; in the two right columns of each panel, it is fraction of remittances 
received by female members. F test gives the F-statistics of joint significance of the two IV 
	  
	  
98 
variables. While the first stage results in Panels A, B, C, E, and F appear to be less robust, in 
Panel D the instruments have a strong and significant relationship with total remittances and 
fraction received by women. The F statistics are greater than 12 for total remittances and greater 
than 40 for fraction of remittance received by women. For the household outcomes, the first-stage 
regression for total remittances shows that an increase of 0.02 i.e., one standard deviation in the 
1992 migration rates, increases remittances by almost 400,000 VN Dong or about 10% increase 
in the average total remittances received in the sample. Thus, regions with historically high 
migration rates provide stable migration networks for the region and continue to have a positive 
association with future migration rates as reflected in the total household remittances. We also 
find that as the households with a greater fraction of women live in historically high migration 
rates, the share of women receiving remittances increases. Overall, for the household outcomes, 
we find the relationships between the endogenous variables and the instruments to be highly 
significant.   
 Tables 3.3-3.6 provide OLS and IV estimates of the impacts of remittances on various 
individual and household outcomes. Table 3.3 reports the regressions on educational outcomes, 
limiting to the sample of young people. Interestingly, OLS estimates reveal that total remittances 
have not associated with years of education or with attendance. When we control for the fraction 
of total household remittances received by women, we see that while total of remittances are 
negatively correlated with the number of years of schooling and with school attendance, the 
fraction is positively correlated with these two outcomes. An increase of 50% in the fraction of 
women receiving remittances is associated with about half an extra year of schooling and 0.09 
higher probability of attending school. The following column in each panel displays the IV 
estimates of the impacts of remittances on education. We see that when we conduct 2SLS 
estimation, our standard errors increased greatly and that the IV estimates reveal insignificant 
relationship between remittances and the educational outcome of the young. Below the IV 
estimates are the F Statistics and p-value from the Hausman test for endogeneity of the two 
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variables of interest. For the outcome of the years of education, we can conclude that the 
variables are endogenous and that we should rely on the instruments. However, for the attendance 
outcome, we can conclude that IV estimates are inefficient.  
 The OLS estimates in Table 3.4 show the relationship between the body-mass index of 
young, adult and elderly members of the household and the total remittances and the share of 
remittances going to women. Interestingly, an increase in total remittances is associated with a 
higher BMI for all three groups, but the share of remittances received by women has little 
association with the BMI of these individuals. The IV estimates show that remittances have no 
significant impact on the BMI of the household members. Looking at the F-statistic and p-value 
from the Hausman test, the OLS and IV estimates are significantly different from each other for 
the adults, but not for the young and the elders. 
 Table 3.5 reports the relationship between total household remittances and employment of 
household members. Under OLS estimation, for young people, there is a positive but very weak 
relationship between total household remittances and the event that young people were employed 
in the past 12 months. An increase in remittances by 100,000 VN Dongs increases the likelihood 
of employment by 0.0006. On the other hand, an increase in the fraction of remittances received 
by females by 50% is associated with a lower probability of child labor of 0.08. However, there is 
no significant association between the two variables and the monthly salary. For the adults, total 
household remittances have a negative correlation with monthly salary in the past 12 months. 
Moreover, fraction of total household remittances going to women is negatively related with 
being employed. For the elders, total household remittances have a negative association with 
being employed. Once we instrument for total remittances and for the share received by women, 
we find little evidence that remittances have an impact on the employment of household 
members. Nor do we find that money receives by women has differential effect on employment 
outcomes. Examining the F-statistic and the p-value of the Hausman test, we can only reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that the two variables of interest are endogenous in the monthly 
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salary outcome for the adults and not for the other samples of data.  
 Regarding OLS estimates of the impact of remittances on household outcomes, Table 3.6 
reports the estimates on household expenditure and household non-farm enterprises. Total 
household remittances have positive association with profit from non-farm businesses, and the 
value of business equipment. On the other hand, the fraction of household remittances received 
by women has no significant association with business profit and a weak negative association 
with the value of business equipment. For households’ expenditures, total household remittances 
have a negative association with the share of household expenditure that is food. Moreover, the 
share of remittances going to women has a positive association with the share of household 
expenditure that is health, but a negative association with the share of expenditure that is food. 
 The third column under each panel in Table 3.6 provides IV estimates of the effects of 
remittances on households’ outcomes. We find that total remittances have positive and significant 
impact on households’ business profit. Specifically, a 100,000 VND increase in total remittances 
increases this amount by more than 200,000 VND. We also find that total remittances have a 
significant and positive impact on households’ share of total expenditure that is education. 
Particularly, a 100,000 VND increase in total remittances increases this share by almost 2 
percent. At the same time, a 100,000 VND increase in total remittances decreases the share of 
household expenditure that is food by 1.6 percent. In terms of fraction of total remittances going 
to women, the share receives by household female members has a positive effect on the share of 
household expenditure that is health. Specifically, a 50 percent increase in this fraction increases 
the share by more than 5 percent. The IV estimates are bigger than the OLS estimates, suggesting 
that the OLS estimates were downwardly biased and that if anything those households where 
women receive a greater share of remittances also do worse in terms of household outcomes. 
Furthermore, the F-statistic and p-value suggest that the OLS and IV estimates differ significantly 
for the outcomes of business profit, education expenditure as a share of household expenditure, 
and health expenditure as a share of household expenditure.  
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 In summary the IV results show that while total remittances are not associated with better 
health, lower adult employment, and higher salaries for those employed, they are positively with 
increased consumption in education and decreased consumption in food items by the households. 
The results also show that increasing women’s control of remittance shifts household 
consumption toward health. Thus, control of monetary transfers from migrants by women matters 
in terms of increasing investment in health more than the actual amount remitted.  
3.6. Conclusion 
 We use the Vietnamese Living Standards Surveys for 1992 and 1997 to examine whether 
women’s control of remittances changes household investments and consumption patterns. 
Unlike the scarce literature that has tested the unitary model of the household exploiting financial 
resources coming from women, we use instrumental variable techniques to eliminate potential 
biases due to the endogeneity of total remittances and of the share of remittances received by 
women. Our IV results are bigger than the OLS results suggesting that those receiving more 
remittances overall and those that send more money to women in the households are less inclined 
to invest and spend. While some of our first stage results are not robust, the evidence is strong in 
showing that increasing overall remittances has positive effects in terms of increasing household 
consumption in education and household business profit. 
 More importantly, our results show that while increased control of remittances by women 
has little impact children outcomes, it shifts households’ expenditure toward health. This result 
suggest that when women are given greater bargaining power they will sway decisions towards 
investment in household health and education than expenditure on food items. Increasing 
women’s decision-making within the household is important in terms of raising human capital for 
family members. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1992 Migration Rate 227.1140 -1.2021 313.5346 -1.3091 156.8304* 0.3568 719.9637 1.1095
(446.8470) (2.2158) (411.3629) (2.1779) (82.1778) (0.3547) (441.3871) (1.4875)
1992 Migration Rate X 
Fraction of Female in the 
Household -1,013.2992 5.4216* -894.2381 5.2335* 68.3121 1.8395*** -286.2774 1.9541
(1,010.8484) (3.0108) (1,064.8077) (3.0976) (105.9511) (0.4450) (302.2582) (1.7983)
F-Test 0.5900 1.7600 0.3600 1.5000 6.4600 16.9600 2.7200 1.8900
p-value 0.5565 0.1758 0.7005 0.2275 0.0016 0.0000 0.0674 0.1524
N 183 183 174 174 6,308 6,308 360 360
1992 Migration Rate 153.8887 -1.1181 929.2646 -2.4152 198.4789*** -0.0967 201.2300*** -0.1415
(489.9729) (2.3613) (928.8807) (3.7345) (53.2580) (0.3169) (52.6197) (0.3190)
1992 Migration Rate X 
Fraction of Female in the 
Household -972.2024 5.4984* -2,093.7656 14.0977* 13.4816 2.9237*** -9.4397 2.9529***
(1,008.3995) (3.0347) (2,073.9760) (7.1382) (58.8696) (0.3470) (53.0151) (0.3489)
F-Test 0.6500 1.8400 0.5200 2.6600 14.24 47.6000 12.9800 47.2500
p-value 0.5250 0.1626 0.5970 0.0808 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 177 177 52 52 5,998 5,998 5,851 5,851
1992 Migration Rate 158.4044** 0.4053 149.2732* 0.4569 706.8372 1.4451 125.2725* 1.3944
(80.6483) (0.3551) (84.6333) (0.3557) (436.8953) (1.4712) (66.8185) (1.8476)
1992 Migration Rate X 
Fraction of Female in the 
Household 62.9458 1.8706*** 53.0913 1.6001*** -258.2537 1.4054 92.7012 2.7008
(103.9380) (0.4414) (109.7639) (0.4452) (293.8646) (1.8128) (68.5262) (2.4319)
F-Test 6.5800 18.3300 5.6900 14.9500 2.8600 1.7400 7.0700 2.6200
p-value 0.0014 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0590 0.1764 0.0011 0.0755
N 6,437 6,437 5,889 5,889 371 371 202 202
Elders
Value of Business 
Equipment Other Household's Outcomes
Table 3.2. First Stage Results 
Notes: First-stage results are presented for all outcomes when the sample of data varies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications contain
whether household is in an urban area, household size, whether female heads the household, mother's and fathers' number of years of education, and 1992 region-level
variables, which are the poverty rate and the rate of landlessness among rural households in the region. The individual-level regressions also contain information on the
person's sex and age. Dependent variable in specifications on the two left columns of each panel is Total of remittances; in the two right columns of each panel, it is
Fraction of remittances received by female members.  F test gives the F-statistics of joint significance of the two IV variables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A. Education
E. Employment: Adults F. Employment: Elders
Employed in the Past 12 
Months
Monthly Salary from job 
in the Past 12 Months
C. Employment: Young
B. BMI
D. Household's Outcomes
Two Educational Outcomes Young Adults
IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total of Remittances -0.0011 -0.0029** 3.0851 -0.0003 -0.0006*** 0.5825
(0.0011) (0.0013) (701.9062) (0.0002) (0.0002) (131.9304)
Fraction received by Female 
Members 1.0062** 583.7288 0.1897** 109.4436
(0.3857) (130,952.5904) (0.0762) (24,613.7277)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 5.04 0.6800
p-value from Hausman Test 0.0077 0.5084
N 183 183 183 183 183 183
Table 3.3. OLS and IV Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Education 
OLS OLS
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at household level and reported in parentheses. All specifications contain age, sex, whether
household is in an urban area, household size, whether female heads the household, mother's and fathers' number of years of education,
and 1992 region-level variables, which are the poverty rate and the rate of landlessness among rural households in the region. The
instruments are migration rates from Vietnam's 7 regions coming from the 1992 survey and the interaction of this variable and the
fraction fo female in the households. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total of Remittances 0.0003 0.0006** -0.0279 -0.0015** -0.0009 0.0029
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.3883) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0099)
Fraction received by Female 
Members -0.1548* -4.8762 -0.3464 0.0669
(0.0932) (71.3824) (0.2204) (1.1134)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 0.3900 0.0600
p-value from Hausman Test 0.6791 0.9381
N 177 177 177 52 52 52
Total of Remittances -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0010* -0.0011** 0.0187
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0290)
Fraction received by Female 
Members -0.0472*** 0.0382 0.0788 2.0587
(0.0134) (0.2213) (0.1166) (3.5304)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 0.4200 8.3000
p-value from Hausman Test 0.6593 0.0003
N 6,437 6,437 6,437 5,889 5,889 5,889
Total of Remittances -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0017 0.0017 0.0024 0.0924
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.1919)
Fraction received by Female 
Members 0.0097 0.7290 -0.0876 -5.6488
(0.0788) (1.1491) (0.1188) (10.9479)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 0.3100 1.7500
p-value from Hausman Test 0.7366 0.1775
N 371 371 371 202 202 202
Table 3.5. OLS and IV Estimates of the Impact of Remittances on Employment 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at household level and reported in parentheses. All specifications contain age, sex, whether
household is in an urban area, household size, whether female heads the household, mother's and fathers' number of years of education,
and 1992 region-level variables, which are the poverty rate and the rate of landlessness among rural households in the region. The
instruments are migration rates from Vietnam's 7 regions coming from the 1992 survey and the interaction of this variable and the
fraction fo female in the households. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Employed in the Past 12 Months Monthly Salary from job in the Past 12 Months
A. Young
B. Adults
C. Elders
OLS OLS
IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total of Remittances 0.0814 0.0924* 2.3921*** 0.3772** 0.4122** 1.3991
(0.0507) (0.0519) (0.8227) (0.1738) (0.1806) (1.1779)
Fraction received by Female 
Members -8.6563 -61.2129 -27.0782* 46.8146
(6.0839) (68.7697) (16.3704) (127.2398)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 8.1700 0.7000
p-value from Hausman Test 0.0003 0.4986
N 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,851 5,851 5,851
Total of Remittances 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019*** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004)
Fraction received by Female 
Members -0.0003 -0.0570 0.0276*** 0.1098***
(0.0025) (0.0425) (0.0038) (0.0270)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 18.6400 7.2600
p-value from Hausman Test 0.0000 0.0007
N 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,998 5,998
Total of Remittances -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0016*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009)
Fraction received by Female 
Members -0.0201*** -0.0437
(0.0054) (0.0506)
F-Stats from Hausman Test 2.0200
p-value from Hausman Test 0.1324
N 5,998 5,998 5,998
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications contain whether household is in an urban area, household size,
whether female heads the household, mother's and fathers' number of years of education, and 1992 region-level variables, which are the poverty
rate and the rate of landlessness among rural households in the region. The instruments are migration rates from Vietnam's 7 regions coming from
the 1992 survey and the interaction of this variable and the fraction fo female in the households.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS OLS
Table 3.6. OLS and IV Estimates of the Impact of Remitances on Household Entrepreneurial Activities  and Household Expenditures 
Value of Business Equipment Business Profit
Education Expenditures as a Share of Total Expenditure Health Expenditure as a Share of Total Expenditure
Food Expenditures as a Share of Total Expenditure
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